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VI 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The claims in this appeal arise out of the suicide of Bradley Munroe ("Munroe") on 
September 29, 2008, while incarcerated at the Ada County Jail ("Jail"). 
A. Procedural History. 
On January 23, 2009, Rita Hoagland, Munroe's mother ("Hoagland"), filed her first 
complaint in this case ("First Complaint"). Hoagland brought her lawsuit individually and in her 
capacity as personal representative of Munroe's estate ("Estate"). Hoagland named as 
defendants Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney ("Sheriff'), several Sheriff s deputies, and Leslie 
Robertson, the Administrative Supervisor for the Jail's Health Services Unit ("Defendants"),] 
and alleged that detention deputies were watching a televised football game instead of observing 
Munroe. The First Complaint included: (i) a civil rights § 1983 claim by the Estate against the 
Defendants (except for the Sheriff) regarding a violation of Munroe's constitutional rights; (ii) a 
state tort action for wrongful death by the Estate and Hoagland against all of the Defendants; and 
(iii) a state tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by Hoagland against 
Robertson. 
Due to the lack of evidence supporting such claims, on May 28, 2010, the Defendants 
filed a dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment, a supporting Memorandum, and fourteen (14) 
supporting Affidavits. 
I For clarity purposes, the defendants in this appeal will collectively be referred to as "the 
Defendants," even though the defendants changed when Hoagland filed her amended complaints. 
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On June 23, 2010, Hoagland and the Estate filed their Opposition to the Motion. 
However, instead of addressing the defenses, Hoagland and the Estate elected to withdraw all of 
their state law claims and dismiss all of the Defendants except for the Sheriff. Hoagland and the 
Estate also sought leave to amend their First Complaint to allege entirely new causes of action 
under § 1983 against different defendants regarding Munroe's medical treatment. 
At a hearing on July 8, 2010, the District Court granted Hoagland and the Estate's request 
to amend their First Complaint and denied the Defendants' request for discovery protection, 
which allowed Hoagland and the Estate to conduct further discovery and continued the summary 
judgment proceeding indefinitely. Hoagland and the Estate filed their Amended Complaint on 
July 12, 2010, but did not serve it on any of the Defendants. Instead, a month later, they sought 
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add additional allegations and, a day later, sought 
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. 
At a September 13, 2010, hearing, the District Court allowed Hoagland and the Estate to 
proceed with their Third Amended Complaint, which was ninety (90) pages long and contained 
four hundred sixty-six (466) paragraphs. It alleged federal § 1983 claims against all new 
Defendants, and bared little resemblance to the First Complaint. 
On September 20, 2010, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended 
Complaint, based on the ineligibility of the Estate and Hoagland as § 1983 plaintiffs under Idaho 
law. By Memorandum and Order dated November 2, 2010, the District Court agreed with the 
Defendants and determined that the Estate was not a valid plaintiff. However, the District Court 
held that Hoagland had standing to continue her lawsuit. 
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In light of the major shift in Hoagland's underlying theories and culpable parties, the 
Defendants revised their defenses and file a new summary judgment motion, this time tailored to 
the § 1983 claims alleged against the new Defendants. The Defendants' Restated Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum were filed on November 12,2010. The District Court's 
January 20, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order granted summary judgment in favor of Ada 
County, every Defendant in his or her official capacity, and every Defendant in his or her 
personal capacity save for social worker James Johnson ("Johnson"). 
Both Hoagland and Johnson (the only remaining Defendant) moved the District Court to 
reconsider its summary judgment decision. On March 28, 2011, the District Court entered its 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration, which dismissed Hoagland's lawsuit in its entirety by dismissing Johnson. 
Prevailing parties by virtue of the dismissals, on March 4, 2011, the Defendants brought a 
motion to recoup taxpayer dollars expended in its defense of the variety of claims brought by the 
Estate and Hoagland. That Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees was denied in its entirety in the 
March 30, 2011, District Court's Order. Since it was not clear that the District Court intended to 
deny costs, the Defendants filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the March 
30,2011, Order, and a hearing was held on September 15,2011. On October 17,2011, the 
District Court issued its Order, which awarded the Defendants their costs as a matter of right and 
additional discretionary costs. 
On May 4, 2011, Hoagland filed her Notice of Appeal, and the Final Judgment was 
entered on May 25, 2011. Hoagland filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 28,2011. 
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B. Factual Background.2 
Munroe was born in Portland, Oregon, in January 1989. 05/2811 0 Dickinson Aff. 
(pending augmentation). Early in his life, Munroe moved to California and eventually to Canyon 
County, Idaho. ld. He became disruptive in school and ultimately became involved in the 
juvenile criminal justice system. ld., R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 5). By age thirteen 
(13), Munroe was no longer living at home full-time. ld. From June 2002 to February 2003, 
Munroe was living at the Nampa Boys Home. Id., Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 6). At age 
fourteen (14), he was committed to the Idaho Juvenile Department of Correction. Id. For the 
next few years he was under IJDOC's jurisdiction and control until his release in May 2006. Id. 
Although Hoagland continued to live in Melba, over the next few years Munroe was 
intermittently homeless in California, Utah, Boise, Melba, Caldwell and Nampa. Id. Munroe 
also spent time in various county jails. Id.; R. pp. 148-150. Munroe was in a Utah jail in 
September of 2007, and again in May of 2008. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 7). In 
Idaho, Munroe was booked into the Jail on October 27,2007, July 4, 2008, August 28, 2008, and 
September 28, 2008. R. pp. 148-150. 
Munroe's August 28, 2008, incarceration resulted from his attempt to steal $5.00 from a 
Winco grocery store in Boise. R. p. 3851, Ex. 1 (Robinson Aff., Ex. A, p. 5). He was sentenced 
to thirty (30) days in the Jail. R. p. 148-150. With credit for time served, he was released on 
September 26, 2008. Id. 
2 As Hoagland's version of the facts is quite limited, the Defendants are compelled to provide 
their own account. 
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Two (2) days later, on September 28, 2008, Munroe robbed a Maverick Country Store in 
Boise, threatening the clerk by telling her he had a bomb inside his backpack. R. p. 3851, Ex. 1 
(Robinson Aff., Ex. B); R. p. 146, , 7. The clerk gave Munroe the money from the cash register. 
R. p. 3851, Ex. 1 (Robinson Aff., Ex. B); R. p. 146, ~ 7. Munroe fled the Maverick Store on a 
bicycle and was apprehended a short time later by the Boise City Police. R. p. 146, " 5-6. 
Munroe told the officers there was cash in the backpack, but no bomb, and that he wanted an 
attorney. !d. at , 7. 
The arresting officers noted a strong odor of alcohol about Munroe. Id. at , 6. After 
being placed in their patrol car he became uncooperative, kicking and hitting his head against the 
windows. Id. at, 8. The officers hobbled him and drove to the Boise Police Department. Id. at 
, 8; R. p. 147, , 9. The officers then called the paramedics, who transported Munroe to the 
emergency room at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center to be cleared for admittance to the 
Jail. 3 Id. 
At the hospital, Munroe was examined by the emergency room medical staff, and the 
doctor's diagnostic impressions were: "acute alcohol intoxication, polysubstance abuse, abrasion 
secondary to apprehension by police tonight with resistance, and chronic back pain." R. p. 3851, 
Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 5). The doctor cleared Munroe to be transported and housed at the 
Jail. R. p. 147, ~ 10. The officers then transported Munroe to the Jail. Id. 
3 In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland incorrectly represents that, "[t]he arresting officers found 
Bradley's behavior so bizarre that they took him to the hospital for evaluation." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
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Once at the Jail, Munroe began the booking process. R. p. 160, ~ 5. Part of the booking 
process involves taking the fingerprints of arrestees and asking a standard set of questions to 
determine the health and wellbeing of the individual. R. p. 142, , 4. Munroe continued to be 
uncooperative, and the booking deputies were unable to complete this process. R. p. 160, " 6-7. 
The deputies placed Munroe in one of the holding cells next to the booking area due to his 
continued behavior and for his wellbeing. R. p. 160, , 7. When an inmate is placed in such a 
cell, the deputies begin an Inmate Housing Security Check Log ("Log"), which is located by the 
holding cell door. R. p. 160, , 9. It contains space for deputies to record each time the inmate is 
checked and monitored, and also a comment section. Jd. The deputies monitored Munroe 
closely and checked on him every fifteen (15) minutes for approximately nine (9) hours.4 R. p. 
160, , 8 Ex. A. 
The next morning, September 29, 2008, at approximately 8:00 a.m., Deputy Jeremy 
Wroblewski ("Wroblewski"), a booking deputy in training, resumed the booking process by 
fingerprinting Munroe and completing a booking form that contained mental health questions. 
R. p. 142, " 4, 5, 8. When Wroblewski asked Munroe these questions, Munroe answered that 
he was thinking about, had thought about and had previously attempted suicide. Jd. at , 8. 
Munroe then explained that he was thinking about suicide earlier, but not now. Jd.; R. p. 3291. 
4 In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland alleges that while in the holding cell, Munroe's clothes were 
taken away after he "tried to strangle himself with them." Appellant's Brief, p. 3. As noted in 
the Log, Munroe's clothes were removed, "as he was trying to take string and wrap around his 
neck." R. p. 164. There is nothing in the Record that supports Hoagland's allegation that 
Munroe was "strangling" himself. 
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A booking deputy also contacted the Jail's Health Services Unit ("HSU"). R. p. 142, ';5. 
Ada County employs psychiatric social workers that conduct assessments of inmates to 
determine their mental status and level of functioning, for the purpose of determining if any 
intervention is warranted. R. pp. 156-157, ,;~ 5-9. Johnson, a Masters level psychiatric social 
worker, came to the booking area and assessed Munroe. 5 R. p. 142, ~~ 5-6. 
As part of the assessment process, Johnson first reviewed the Jail's medical records to see 
if the Jail had previously cared for Munroe. R. p. 137, ,; 17. The medical records showed that 
Johnson had previously assessed Munroe on September 1, 2008. Id. at ~ 18. Johnson reviewed 
Munroe's previous medical and psychological information. Id. at ,; 17. Johnson noted that 
Munroe denied suicidal ideation during his previous incarceration at the Jail, and he could find 
no information that he in any way attempted to hurt himself during that incarceration. Id. at ~ 18. 
The next step of the assessment process involved speaking with Munroe. R. p. 138, ~ 19. 
Johnson met with Munroe in the booking area of the Jail. Id. at,;,; 18-19; R. p. 142, ~,; 5-6. 
Munroe told Johnson that he was not suicidal. R. p. 138, ,; 21. Munroe explained that he was 
intoxicated/high the previous night and that was the explanation for his behavior. Id. Munroe 
assured Johnson, and later Wroblewski, that he would not hurt himself. Id.; R. p. 142, ~ 8. 
5 Johnson came to the Jail with twenty (20) years of prior experience. R. p. 136, ,;,; 4-11. After 
graduating from the University of Southern California in 1984 with a Masters Degree in Social 
Work, Johnson worked in a hospital, counseling patients with injuries, cancer and discharge 
planning. Id. at ~,; 6-7. Later he worked with and counseled homeless individuals and provided 
mental health services to low-income populations. Id. at ,; 8. He has also worked with 
chronically mentally ill patients as well as with crisis intervention, suicide and emergency 
response teams. Id. at,; 9. He had experience working in juvenile detention facilities and jails, 
counseling inmates and assessing the likelihood that they would harm themselves. Id. at ~ 10. 
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Next, Johnson directly observed Munroe as he completed the booking process. R. pp. 
137-138, 'i~ 18,19,22. It was important for Johnson to observe Munroe, his affect, and how he 
interacted with and answered Wroblewski's questions. Id. at ~~ 19,21-22. Johnson observed 
that Munroe followed directions, was not distracted and expressed himself properly. Id. at ~~ 19, 
22. Munroe's reactions to instructions were appropriate, and he was alert, calm and cooperative. 
Id. at ~ 22. There was no evidence of current sadness, distress, emotional lability, inattention, 
distractibility, or of any distortion in Munroe's thought process. Id. In other words, he appeared 
to be coping with his current circumstances and interacting with staff without difficulty. Id. 
Based on his assessment, Johnson (relying on his training and twenty (20) years of experience) 
determined that Munroe's suicide risk level was not sufficient to warrant admission to the Jail's 
HSU. R. p. 139, ~ 25. 
At approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, Hoagland called the HSU. R. p. 152, ~~ 4-5. 
Robertson, the HSU's Administrative Supervisor, answered the telephone. Id. at ~ 5. Robertson 
was not familiar with either Munroe or Hoagland. Id. at ~~ 4, 7. Hoagland told Robertson that 
Munroe was arrested and in the Jail, and that he was nineteen (19) and homeless. Id. at ~ 6. 
Hoagland also told Robertson that Munroe had attempted suicide in the past, and she had heard 
that he may be suicidal again. Id. at ~ 8. 
Robertson discussed the HSU with Hoagland, including what a suicide watch entailed. 
Id. at ~ 9. Due to privacy concerns, Robertson was unable to tell Hoagland anything else other 
than she would pass on the information to a social worker. Id. After they hung up, Johnson 
walked into Robertson's office and she relayed to him the contents of Hoagland's call. R. p. 153, 
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~ 10; R. p. 139, ~ 26. Robertson then called Hoagland and told her a social worker was aware of 
Munroe. R. p. 153, ~ ll. Johnson, who had just finished his assessment, took the information 
from Hoagland into consideration and did not change his assessment. R. p. 139, ~ 27. 
After Munroe's booking was complete, Wroblewski asked Deputy Ryan Donelson 
("Donelson") to escort Munroe from the booking area to the Closed Custody Unit ("CCU") for 
housing in a multi-person cell. R. p. 167, ~ 4. On the way to the CCU, Munroe stopped 
Donelson and said that he needed to be in protective custody ("PC") because he could not live 
with other people, and that everyone wanted to kill him. Id. at ~ 5. When Donelson asked who 
wanted to harm him, Munroe replied that he was into a lot of stuff and everyone wanted to kill 
him. Id. at ~~ 5-6. Donelson asked Munroe if he could name those he was having trouble with, 
and Munroe said no. R. p. 168, ~ 7. 
Because of Munroe's concerns for his own safety, Donelson placed him in a holding cell 
in the CCU area and let the classification deputies know of Munroe's safety concerns. Id. at ~ 8. 
For Munroe's protection and safety from other inmates, the classification deputy, Mike Drinkall 
("Drinkall"), located an empty cell in the "side chute" of Cellblock 7. R. p. 132, ~~ 4-5. The 
side chute is a group of smaller cells to the side of the day room in Cellblock 7, where PC 
inmates are commonly housed. R. p. 168, ~ 8. Donelson took Munroe out of the holding cell 
and headed to Cellblock 7. Id. at ~ 9. Drinkall called Johnson to inform him of Munroe's cell 
placement in the side chute. R. p. 133, ~ 6. 
When Donelson and Munroe arrived at Cellblock 7, Munroe started a conversation with 
some of the other inmates, laughing and joking with them. R. p. 168, ~ 10. Munroe told 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 9 
Donelson that he would be okay in that Cellblock, and that he would just live there, stating that 
he would be just fine there. Id. Donelson told Munroe that Cellblock 7 was not a pre-
classification area (Munroe was not yet classified on his new charge). Id. A deputy assigned to 
Cellblock 7 met them and Munroe was taken to his cell in the side chute. Id. at ~ 11. 
At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, housing Deputy Kevin Manning ("Manning") 
conducted a standing headcount of the inmates. R. p. 171, ~'r 3-4. As part of the headcount, 
Manning walked the entire Cellblock 7, day room, and side chute, making sure he saw every 
inmate. Id He looked in on each inmate and spoke with him and, even if an inmate was asleep, 
the inmate had to stand and speak to Manning. Id This is to ensure that each inmate is safe, 
healthy, and is accounted for. Id 
During the standing headcount, Munroe requested that Manning take his food tray from 
his cell. Id at ~5. Munroe was not acting in any fashion that alerted Manning that he might 
harm himself. Id Had Manning observed Munroe acting or indicating in any manner that he was 
contemplating harm to himself, Manning would have intervened immediately. R. p. 172, ~ 11. 
In addition to the standing headcount, wellbeing checks of the inmates also take place. R. 
p. 171, ~ 6; R. p. 122, ~ 5. Housing Deputy Marshall McKinley ("McKinley") conducted 
wellbeing checks of the inmates in Cellblock 7, including Munroe. R. p. 122, ~~ 5-7. During a 
wellbeing check, deputies make sure all of the inmates are safe and well by listening to the 
imnates to make sure they are all getting along, and interceding when necessary. Id at ~ 5. They 
also walk by the cells and look in on the inmates to make sure they are well. Id at ~ 6. 
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At 8:08 p.m., McKinley began a wellbeing check of Cellblock 7, starting with the main 
tier and ending with the side chute where Munroe was housed. Id. at ~ 7. McKinley did not 
notice anything out of the ordinary in Munroe's cell. Id. If McKinley had observed Munroe 
acting or indicating in any manner that he was contemplating harm to himself, McKinley would 
have intervened immediately. R. p. 123, ~ 10. 
At 8:35 p.m., McKinley began another wellbeing check of Cellblock 7, this time starting 
with the side chute in which Munroe was housed. Id. at ~ 8. When McKinley looked in 
Munroe's cell, he appeared to have a sheet wrapped around his neck and was in a sitting position 
at the end of the bunk. Id. McKinley immediately radioed Deputy Michael Vineyard for 
assistance, then called Central Control to let him into the cell, and then called for a Code 3 
Assist. Id. McKinley ran into the cell and started removing the sheet from Munroe's neck, 
checked for breathing and a pulse, and after finding neither, he and another deputy lifted Munroe 
free of the sheet and laid him in the center of the cell and started CPR immediately. Id. 
A nurse from the HSU quickly arrived and took over CPR for McKinley. Id. at ~ 9. 
Several deputies had arrived in Cellblock 7 by this time and the paramedics arrived on scene 
shortly thereafter. Id. The paramedics transported Munroe out of Cellblock 7, continuing to 
conduct CPR. Id. The paramedics transported Munroe to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, where he was later pronounced dead. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to 
I.e. §§ 12-121,12-123, I.A.R. 41, and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
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III. ARGUMENT 
The Defendants submit that neither the Estate nor Hoagland are proper plaintiffs in this 
case. As the District Court recognized, and as argued below, the Estate cannot bring a § 1983 
cause of action in Idaho. And, as argued in the Defendants' Cross-Appeal, Hoagland, as a parent 
of an adult child, should be prohibited from bringing such an action in Idaho. Since both 
Plaintiffs lack standing, the entire case should be dismissed on appeal. 
Nevertheless, if one or both of the Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed, the dismissal of the 
remaining Defendants should still be upheld. Hoagland asserts that the District Court incorrectly 
dismissed the following individually named Defendants James Johnson, Jeremy Wroblewski, 
and Kate Pape. As argued below, the District Court applied the correct legal standards and 
correctly dismissed each of them. The District Court also correctly dismissed Ada County, as 
Hoagland is unable to establish a valid Monell claim against Ada County. 
Finally, as the prevailing parties, the award of both costs as a matter of right and 
discretionary costs to the Defendants should be upheld. Since Hoagland cannot prove that the 
District Court abused its discretion, such award should be upheld on appeal. 
A. The District Court Correctly Held That Munroe's Estate Is Not a Valid Plaintiff. 
When dismissing the Estate from this lawsuit, the District Court held: 
In sum, Idaho law does not allow Munroe's estate to bring a claim. Standing 
alone, such an outcome might be inconsistent with the policies underlying 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. However, because, when viewed through the larger lens of the 
entirety ofIdaho's survivorship law, such an outcome is not inconsistent with the 
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Robertson, the claim brought on behalf of 
Munroe's estate and by Ms. Hoagland as an heir to Munroe's estate must be 
dismissed. 
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R. p. 1584. Such analysis is correct, and the outcome should be upheld. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The District Court dismissed the Estate based on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
Regarding the proper standard of review, this Court has held: 
The standards for reviewing a district court's dismissal under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure I2(b)( 6) and granting summary judgment are similar but not identical. 
Youngv. CityoJKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159(2002). As to 
both, "the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences ... viewed in his 
favor." Id. However, a 12(b)( 6) motion looks only to the complaint to determine 
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. I d. 
Independent School Dist. oj Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd., 150 Idaho 583, 587,249 P.3d 382, 
386, (2011). 
2. The District Court Was Correct in Holding That an Estate Cannot Be a Valid 
§ 1983 Plaintiff Under Idaho Law. 
As the District Court recognized, this Court has never allowed an estate to bring a § 1983 
action. This matter was a main issue for this Court in Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 
210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). In that case, Mrs. Evans, along with her husband, brought § 1983 
claims against Twin Falls County Sheriffs deputies arising from an altercation that took place 
during the execution of a writ. Mrs. Evans died during the pendency of the litigation. After her 
death, the complaint was amended to join her estate as a plaintiff and the district court treated the 
matter as also including a wrongful death claim in light of the allegation that the death of Mrs. 
Evans was caused by the actions of the defendants. Id. at 213, 90. 
In that case, this Court discussed § 1983 claims and whether those constitutional claims 
survived Mrs. Evans' death. This Court held that "the common law has not been modified or 
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changed in Idaho either by statute or the Constitution, and therefore the general common law rule 
that personal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured party is the rule in Idaho." 
Id. at 217, 94 (citations omitted). This Court then explained that "[t]he § 1983 cause of action, 
by virtue of the statute's express language, is a personal cause of action, actionable only by 
persons whose civil rights have been violated. Thus, under Idaho law Mrs. Evans' § 1983 action 
does not survive." Id. 6 
The Evans decision regarding the right of survival has been the law in this State for over 
twenty (20) years and is still controlling, and Hoagland offers no legitimate argument for 
oveliurning that decision. 
Underscoring the inability of an estate to bring a § 1983 claim in Idaho is Judge Boyle's 
decision in Anderson v. Correctional Medical Services, 2005 WL 3263896 (D.Idaho Nov. 18, 
2005) (No. CV 02-155-S-LMB). In Anderson, an inmate brought a § 1983 cause of action 
against a prison's health providers for failing to treat his cancer that resulted in his death during 
the pendency of the action. The Idaho federal district court noted that "[a] cause of action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the death of a plaintiff for the benefit of plaintiffs estate only if the 
law of the forum state creates a right of survival," and that this issue was squarely dealt with in 
Evans. Anderson, 2005 WL 3263896 at *2. More importantly, and despite Judge Boyle's 
reservations, the court ruled that: 
6 See also, Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 857-59, 736 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1987) (representative 
of decedent not allowed to bring wrongful death claim against alleged tortfeasor causing the 
injury). 
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[T]he Evans holding appears to restrict all § 1983 claims in which the plaintiff 
dies before a trial, including a scenario in which the defendant allegedly caused 
the death of the plaintiff. .. . This court can not, on its own initiative, limit the 
plainly-broad holding of Evans even to prevent abuses, i.e., even to discourage 
defendants from delaying litigation in the anticipation of a plaintiff's death in 
order to achieve an abatement of the claims against them. 7 Clearly, Evans holds 
that all § 1983 claims abate upon the Plaintiff's death. 
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
Thus, not only has this Court squarely ruled that an estate cannot bring this type of action, 
in addition, an Idaho federal district court interpreting and applying this COUl1's decision in a § 
1983 action reached the same conclusion. 8 As recognized by the District Court, any civil rights 
claim in this matter was personal to Munroe and did not survive his passing. Therefore, the 
Estate cannot bring this action, and was properly dismissed by the District Court. 
3. Hoagland Has Misconstrued Case Law. 
Hoagland argues that the District Court (and impliedly the Federal District Court in 
Anderson) engaged in an overbroad reading of Evans when precluding the Estate from bringing a 
§ 1983 action. She forwards that Evans is limited to instances where the underlying cause of the 
claim did not result in the decedent's death. However, this Court did not restrict its holding to 
h . 9 suc Instances. Further, as cited to above, Anderson dismissed the identical argument, 
explaining that Evans restricts all § 1983 claims in which a plaintiff dies before trial, including 
the scenario in which the defendant allegedly caused the death. Jd. 
7 This concern could not be an issue here given that the claims arose as a result of a suicide. 
8 See also, Gomez v. Reinke, 2008 WL 3200794 (D. Idaho August 7, 2008) (No. CV91-299-S-
LMB). 
9 In fact, Evans was a case where the plaintiff alleged that the underlying cause of the claim did 
result in the decedent's death. Evans, 118 Idaho at 213, 796 P .2d at 90. 
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Hoagland also bases her argument on her reading of Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 
584 (1978). This is problematic for at least two (2) reasons. First, in Robertson, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated, "We intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on state 
law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death." Id. at 
594. As such, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the specific issue (which is the issue in the current 
controversy) was not before them and they would not rule on it. Therefore, there is nothing in 
Robertson that precludes a state's survivorship law from abating a § 1983 action. 
Second, and more importantly, applying the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Robertson 
to a situation in which the alleged "deprivation of federal rights caused death" leads to the 
conclusion that abatement based on Idaho law would be allowed. The § 1983 survivorship 
analysis set forth in Robertson is as follows: 
When federal law is thus "deficient," § 1988 instructs us to turn to "the common 
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes 0 f the [forum] 
State," as long as these are "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States." 
Jd. at 588 (citations omitted). Thus, if federal law is insufficient courts rely on the law of the 
forum state. "[O]ne specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to 'the survival of 
civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant. '" Id. at 589 
(citations omitted). Therefore, the laws of the forum state govern.! 0 
!O The Robertson Court continued, "Despite the broad sweep of § 1983, we can find nothing in 
the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular 
action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship." Id. at 590. 
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Even if the forum state's laws would cause abatement of the § 1983 claims, such 
abatement laws are still applicable. 
A state statute cannot be considered "inconsistent" with federal law merely 
because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the 
§ 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to 
state law, for the appropriate rule would then always be one favoring the plaintiff, 
and its source would be essentially irrelevant. 
Id. at 593. Thus, abatement of the § 1983 cause of action is not inconsistent with federal law. II 
The Robertson Court used this analysis to conclude that the § 1983 action in that case 
should be dismissed pursuant to Louisiana's survivorship statute. Applying the same analysis to 
the case at bar reaches the same result. "The common law has not been modified or changed in 
Idaho either by statute or the Constitution, and therefore the general common law rule that 
personal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured party is the rule in Idaho." 
Evans, 118 Idaho at 217, 796 P .2d at 94 (citation omitted); see also, Doe v. Cutter Biological, 
Inc., 89 F.3d 844, 1996 WL 344615 *4 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished); Craig v. Gellings, 148 
Idaho 192, 194, 219 P.3d 1208, 1210 (Ct.App. 2009) (Unmarried plaintiffs personal injury 
claims abate upon death). Applying Idaho's survivorship law results in abatement of any § 1983 
claim that could be brought by Munroe and/or his Estate. 
Thus, even if one could somehow argue that the holding in Evans was being read too 
broadly,12 the simple fact of the matter is that the combination of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
II This also nullifies any public policy argument that application of the proper Idaho legal 
standard would undermine the purpose of § 1983. Hoagland appears to miss the point that 
though Idaho law precludes § 1983 claims by an estate in a situation like this, it does provide for 
other remedies through state tort claims that would deter misconduct by a potential wrongdoer. 
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analysis on abatement of § 1983 claims with Idaho's survivorship laws leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the Estate cannot bring a § 1983 action in Idaho. 
4. Hoagland Has Misconstrued Statutorv Authority. 
Hoagland forwards that Idaho Code § 5-327 (regarding survival of actions) provides a 
basis for the Estate to bring a § 1983 claim. l3 Appellant's Brief, p. 68. However, recent 
amendments to this statute demonstrate that in situations such as the current litigation, the Idaho 
Legislature has reasserted that the non-survivability of personal causes of action is still the rule 
in Idaho. In July of 2010, this statute was amended to add a new provision, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
(2) A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the 
wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured 
person from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence .... 
12 Hoagland cites to a number of cases outside of Idaho's jurisdiction in support of her 
contention. Appellant's Brief, p. 56, n. 246. However, at least two (2) of these cases are not § 
1983 cases and do not apply because they are not subject to § 1988, Idaho law, or the analysis set 
forth in Robertson (see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (a Bivens case) and In re Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (a cause of action 
arising under the Alien Tort Act». The remaining cases are also inapplicable because they fail to 
factor in Idaho's survivability laws. Hoagland has failed to point to a single § 1983 case in Idaho 
that stands for the proposition she suggests. 
13 It appears Hoagland has confused wrongful death claims under Idaho law with survivability of 
personal causes of action upon death. Appellant's Brief, p. 54. These are separate and distinct 
claims. See Doe at *2. Idaho Code § 5-311 creates a new cause of action (wrongful death) for 
the benefit of an heir, but this is not the same as survivorship of a personal cause of action. By 
its very nature, a wrongful death claim does not survive the decedent since it cannot come into 
existence until the decedent's death. Survivorship, on the other hand, is reflected by Idaho Code 
§ 5-327, which allows (i) most personal causes of action to survive the death of the tortfeasor, 
and (ii) personal causes of action that are not related to the death of the injured party to survive 
the injured party's death. The viability of an estate's § 1983 claim is dependent upon the forum 
state's survivability law (i.e. Idaho Code § 5-327), not wrongful death law, as Hoagland seems to 
suggest. 
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Idaho Code § 5-327 (emphasis added). 
Prior to the recent adoption of this provision, Idaho followed the general common law 
rule that personal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured party. See, Section 
III.A.2 above. The Legislature has now carved out an exception for situations in which the death 
is unrelated to the cause of action. By making such an exception, and not including situations in 
which the death is related to the cause of action, the 2010 Legislature confirmed that a personal 
claim based on actions resulting in the death of the injured party is abated under Idaho law. 14 
Despite the above, Hoagland asks this Court to ignore Idaho legislative intent, 
Congressional intent and U.S. Supreme Court decisions and allow her to bring her case under 
§ 1983. However, it was Hoagland's choice not to utilize Idaho's wrongful death statute. 
Having dismissed the state remedy, Hoagland now urges this Court to expand claims actionable 
under § 1983. In other words, she is advocating constitutionalizing state torts. This request is 
hardly novel. In fact, it is the very practice the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts strive to 
prohibit. 15 The fact that Idaho provides a wrongful death remedy is why Idaho has not frustrated 
14 Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052 (8 th Cir. 2001), further emphasizes this point. In that case, the 
Eighth Circuit was faced with a similar statutory scheme (in Missouri) allowing personal claims 
not resulting in death to survive, but abating such claims when they resulted in death. The court 
noted that if the estate of the decedent had attempted to bring a § 1983 claim, it would not have 
standing to pursue such claims because Missouri's survival statutes did not provide for such 
recovery. Id. at 1057. 
15 The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected reasoning that, "would make of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be 
administered by the States. '" Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). "Affording plaintiffs a 
constitutional due process right to recover against the state in these circumstances would create 
the risk of constitutionalizing all torts against individuals who happen to have families." Russ v. 
Watts, 414 F.3d 783,790 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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§ 1983. The legislature has provided a remedy - a state wrongful death act. The Estate chose to 
abandon that avenue and now urges this Court to adopt a course contrary to settled § 1983 law. 
In light of the above, Hoagland has no basis to argue that the Estate can bring a § 1983 
claim in Idaho, as already demonstrated by this Court, an Idaho federal district court, application 
of the U.S. Supreme Court's § 1983 survivability analysis, and the Idaho Legislature. Therefore, 
the dismissal of the Estate by the District Court should stand on appeal. 
B. The District Court Properly Granted James Johnson Qualified Immunity.16 
Even if this Court finds that one or both of the Plaintiffs have standing to sue the 
Defendants, the District Court's dismissal of Johnson based on qualified immunity was correct. 
As argued below, the Defendants assert that the law regarding a jail's constitutional mandate 
with regard to a potentially suicidal inmate is not clearly established, but even if this Court finds 
that it is, Johnson did not violate Munroe or Hoagland's constitutional rights. Johnson is 
therefore entitled to qualified immunity, as granted by the District Court. 
1. Standard of Review. 17 
The District Court granted Johnson qualified immunity based on the Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration. "The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,592,21 P.3d 908, 914 
16 The Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity for all of the individually named 
Defendants. However, the District Court only specifically conducted the qualified immunity 
analysis (and subsequently granted the immunity) for one Defendant James Johnson. 
17 This same standard also applies to this Court's review of the granting of summary judgment to 
Wroblewski (Section m.c below), Pape (Section III.D below) and Ada County (Section m.E 
below). In the interest of brevity, the standard will not be repeated in those sections. 
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(2001). However, since Hoagland's appeal challenges the District Court's legal conclusions and 
not the actual granting of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendants submit that the 
summary judgment standard of review is appropriate. See, Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, 
Inc., 2012 WL 246678 (Idaho). 
When reviewing a district court's ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court 
applies the same standard used by the district court. Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 
863,252 P.3d 1274,1281 (2011) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Estate 0/ Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 
96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law 
remains, over which this COUl1 exercises free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs 
Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (citations omitted). 
2. The General Qualified Immunity Analysis. IS 
As this Court is aware, qualified immunity immunizes "all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Recently, 
the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the underlying rationale: 
Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public 
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to 
18 "The contours of qualified immunity are the same under both Idaho and Federal law." Nation 
v. State, Dept. a/Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 186, 158 P.3d 953, 962 (2007). 
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shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 
duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of 
whether the government official's error is "a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a 
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fac1." 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citations omitted). 
Because qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 
liability ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985) (emphasis deleted). 
These remarks are further echoed by other U.S. Supreme Court cases finding that under 
qualified immunity, an official will be protected from suit when he or "she makes a decision that, 
even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the 
circumstances .... " Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also, Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). The standard is an objective one that leaves "ample room for 
mistaken jUdgments ... " Malley, 475 U.S. at 343. 
As this Court has held, when a court is presented with a qualified immunity defense, the 
central questions are: "(1) whether, accepting the plaintiff s assertions as true,19 the defendant 
invaded the plaintiffs constitutional rights; and (2) whether the defendant acted reasonably given 
the state of American law at the time." Miller, 150 Idaho at 864, 252 P.3d at 1282. In other 
words, regarding the second question, was the right at issue "clearly established," and was the 
19 Hoagland invites this Court to overrule that portion of Nation that states, "taken in the light 
most favorable to the party asserting immunity." Appellant's Brief, p. 45. However, this Court 
in Miller held that the plaintiffs assertions must be accepted as true. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 
252 P.3d at 1283. Accordingly, and contrary to Hoagland's contention, the District Court 
consistently viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Hoagland. See, R. p. 2329; R. p. 
350l. 
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conduct of the party claiming qualified immunity reasonable? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201-
06; see also, Nation, 144 Idaho at 187, 158 P.3d at 963. A § 1983 plaintiff has the burden to 
prove these steps before his or her case proceeds. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 252 P.3d at 1283. 
As a result of the decision in Pearson, courts now have the discretion to decide the order 
of the steps - that is - courts are now permitted to skip the first step and directly answer whether 
the right was clearly established without first determining whether a constitutional violation 
occurred. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241-242; see also, Miller, 150 Idaho at 864, 252 P.3d at 1282. 
This Court followed that path in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, and also followed the rule 
of constitutional avoidance when deciding not to answer the constitutional question in that case. 
These are the paths that should be followed in this case as well. 
3. As It Did in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, This Court Should Follow the General 
Rule of Constitutional Avoidance and Decline to Rule on the Issue of Whether 
Johnson Violated Munroe's Constitutional Rights. 
In ~Miller (a § 1983 case decided less than one (1) year ago), this Court conducted a 
thoughtful analysis as to why, under the guidance of Pearson, it declined to rule on whether the 
act of forced catheterization violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. See, Miller, 150 
Idaho at 864-65,252 P.3d at 1282-1283. Instead, this Court determined that Christopher Yount, 
the Idaho State trooper who instructed a hospital worker to catheterize plaintiff Jason Miller after 
his arrest for DUI, was entitled to qualified immunity as the law regarding forced 
catheterizations was unsettled. Id. at 865-69, 1283-1287. 
In reaching its determination, this Court held: "Foremost among the reasons for 
declining to adjudicate the Fourth Amendment question is the opportunity to avoid ruling on a 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 23 
constitutional issue. The general rule of constitutional avoidance encourages courts to interpret 
statutes so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional questions.,,20 Jd. at 864, 1282 (citations 
omitted). Furthermore, this Court held that when following this general rule, an appellate court: 
need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff s version of the facts, nor even 
determine whether the plaintiffs allegations actually state a claim. All it need 
determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the 
defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions. 
Jd. at 865, 1283 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528). 
Along these same lines, in the recent case of Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011) 
(a § 1983 qualified immunity case), the U. S. Supreme Court instructed that, "[ c ]ourts should 
think carefully before expending 'scarce judicial resources' to resolve difficult and novel 
questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will 'have no effect on the outcome of 
the case. '" Jd. at 2080 (citations omitted). 
As the District Court correctly held, the law in this case is not clearly established, 
resulting in qualified immunity for Johnson. Consequently, an analysis of whether Johnson 
violated Munroe or Hoagland's constitutional rights will have "no effect on the outcome of the 
case." This Court should therefore follow its analysis in Miller and skip the first prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis and find (as the District Court did) that since the law in this case is 
not clearly established,21 Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity. 
20 Another factor in the decision not to rule on the constitutional issue was that the record in 
Miller was extremely underdeveloped (unlike the case here), but that factor was "subsidiary" to 
the rule of constitutional avoidance. Jd. at 864, 1282. 
21 Equally applicable is this Court's recognition that the Miller case, "should not be decided 
lightly." Miller, 150 Idaho at 864, 252 P.3d at 1282. This Court recognized that, "[p]rescribing 
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4. The District Court Was Correct in Holding That the Law in This Case Is Not 
Clearly Established, Thus Entitling Johnson to Qualified Immunity. 
The District Court made express findings when it granted Johnson qualified immunity -
which is (contrary to Hoagland's assertions) consistent with the law on qualified immunity:22 
After considering all the evidence in the Record, the Court finds that Johnson 
acted in an objectively legally reasonable manner when he incorrectly decided 
that Bradley Munroe was not at imminent risk of suicide on September 29, 2008. 
As the Court made clear in its January 20 Order, the standard to which Johnson is 
held is deliberate indifference, not negligence. His incorrect, but thoughtful, 
analysis is the sort of action that Qualified Immunity protects. 
In summary, while the facts as Ms. Hoagland has alleged them may make out a 
violation by Johnson of a constitutional right, the Court finds that a reasonable jail 
social worker would not have thought he was acting with deliberate indifference 
toward Munroe on September 29, 2008, by clearing Munroe from suicide watch, 
and, therefore, the right Hoagland alleges was violated was not clearly established 
at that time. 
R. pp. 3498-3499.23 
methods the police may use to test for drugs or alcohol in the bloodstream would have a 
significant impact on law enforcement agencies across the State, many of which are daily 
encountering intoxicated drivers." Id. This very reasoning should be applied to the case at hand, 
which also should not be decided lightly. Prescribing procedures for jail social workers to use 
when assessing potentially suicidal inmates would have a significant impact on social workers 
and jail medical units across the State, since suicide is such a common concern in jails. R. p. 
2408 (45:9-18); R. p. 2409 (51:19-25,52:1-21). By deciding the constitutional question here, 
this Court may be imposing its judgment on jail social workers which may chill their clinical 
decision-making process out of fear of legal consequences (the very thing qualified immunity is 
meant to prevent). 
22 When reviewing the facts in this case, we enjoy the benefit of hindsight - a benefit Johnson 
did not have. 
23 When a trial court grants qualified immunity to a defendant, a finding that the facts as alleged 
by a plaintiff may make out a violation of a constitutional right is not the same as a finding that 
the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff. 
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As this Court is aware, a "[g]overnment official's conduct violates clearly established law 
when, at the time of the challenged conduct, '[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' 
that every 'reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" 
al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083. Whether the law is clearly established is a question of law to be 
resolved de novo on appeal. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 252 P.3d 1283. 
Importantly, "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the law was well-
established." !d. A plaintiff must point to either "cases of controlling authority in their 
jurisdiction at the time of the incident" or to "a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such 
that a reasonable officer could not havc believed that his actions were lawful." Wilson v. Layne, 
526 U.S. 603,617 (1999). 
Furthermore, the constitutional right allegedly violated cannot be generally defined. As 
the U.S. Supreme Court instructed, "We do not require a case directly on point, but existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." al-Kidd, 
131 S.Ct. at 2083. As this Court noted, "[t]he Court should not define the right too generally, as 
doing so would essentially vitiate the qualified-immunity doctrine.,,24 Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 
252 P.3d at 1283 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987». 
24 For instance, in lv/iller, the plaintiff asserted that the appropriate legal question should be 
whether the police can obtain bodily fluid from a person reasonably suspected of driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id. This Court, however, stated that such a question is not 
helpful to the analysis and instead, "the question should reflect the factual specifics in [the] 
case." Id. at 866-67, 1283-84. Ultimately, this Court defined the legal question in that case as: 
"Would a reasonable police officer know that as of May 2007, it was unlawful to involuntarily 
catheterize a suspect based on probable cause to search for dissipating evidence even if less-
intrusive alternatives are available?" Id. at 866, 1284. 
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In the context of the legal questions in this case, Hoagland has defined the allegedly 
violated rights of Mumoe and herself too generally. In light of the case law discussed above, 
particularly from this Court, the legal questions must be factually specific to this case. 
Otherwise, the purpose of qualified immunity is abated. 
a. Hoagland Defines the Allegedly Violated Rights of Munroe and Herself 
Too Generallv. 
Contrary to case law, Hoagland defines the allegedly violated rights too generally. 
Regarding Mumoe's rights, she defines the legal question as: 
The contours of Bradley's right to health and safety were well established by 
many cases holding that ajailer violates a detainee's constitutional rights when he 
knows the detainee faces a substantial risk of self-harm and disregards that risk by 
failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm.25 
Appellant's Brief, p. 39. 
While following this Court's guidance in l\filler, the Defendants submit that the more 
appropriate and fact-specific legal question regarding Munroe's rights is as follows: 
Whether a reasonable jail social worker placed in Johnson's shoes on September 
29, 2008, would have known he was acting with deliberate indifference to 
Mumoe's constitutional right to adequate mental healthcare if that hypothetical 
jail social worker allowed placement of Munroe in general population housing 
after reviewing his previous assessment of Munroe, collecting data, studying his 
interactions with deputies, and speaking with and assessing him again. 
Regarding her own rights,26 Hoagland again defines them too broadly: 
25 Elsewhere in the Appellant's Brief Hoagland refers to "the right to reasonably adequate 
healthcare and safety" as being clearly established in 2008. Appellant's Brief, p. 58. Again, this 
is too general and not helpful to the analysis. 
26 In this case, the parties are faced with the unique situation in which the District Court 
determined for the first time under Idaho law that a parent of an adult child can bring a § 1983 
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The contours of Ms. Hoagland's rights in her familial relationship with her son 
were sufficiently established by the existence of numerous cases where parents of 
adult children, and other similar familial relationships, were found to have had a 
constitutionally protected familial interest that was invaded by ajailer's deliberate 
indifference toward a prisoner. 27 
Appellant's Brief, p. 41. 
While the District Court did not address qualified immunity in terms of Hoagland's own 
rights, the Defendants assert that the appropriate legal question is as follows: 
Whether a reasonable jail social worker placed in lohnson's shoes on September 
29, 2008, would have known he was intentionally violating Hoagland's right to a 
familial relationship with her adult son if that social worker allowed placement of 
that son in the general jail population after having reviewed his previous 
assessment of the son, collected further information about the son, observed the 
son's interactions with deputies, and having spoken with and assessed the son. 
wrongful death claim. In arriving at that conclusion, the District Court stated that it "now holds 
the appropriate analysis of Idaho wrongful death claims in a § 1983 context is that followed by 
the Fifth Circuit in Rhyne v. Henderson [County, 973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992)]. ... " R. p. 1585. 
The Rhyne court held that § 1988 could be used to incorporate Texas' wrongful death remedy 
into a § 1983 claim, allowing a mother to recover for "her injury caused by the state's 
deprivation of her son's constitutionally secured liberty interest." Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 391 
(emphasis added). If the mother in Rhyne was allowed to incorporate Texas' wrongful death 
statute (which created a new cause of action in favor of the mother) into § 1988, then it follows 
that the resulting § 1983 substantive due process cause of action would similarly be specific to 
the mother based on her substantive due process rights, and not her son's. The Rhyne court 
follows this path, but at the last minute adds the sentence "[t]o be more precise, our decisions 
allow recovery by Rhyne for her injury caused by the state's deprivation of her son's 
constitutionally secured liberty interests," which appears to contradict its own analysis. Id. As a 
result, it is not clear whose constitutional rights are at issue. Is it the mother's substantive due 
process liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with her son, or is it the son's due process 
rights? If it is actually the mother's (which is more consistent with the Rhyne court's legal 
analysis), then what are the contours of that right? Consequently, the Defendants will argue their 
rosition regarding both Mumoe's and Hoagland's rights. 
7 The Defendants disagree with Hoagland's assertion that this cause of action exists in the 
United States. See Cross-Appellants' Brief, Section A, pp. 2-9. 
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As argued below, Hoagland has not met her burden of proving that the law was clearly 
established regarding Munroe's and her own rights. As such, and consistent with the District 
Court's holding, Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity. 
b. Hoagland Cannot Meet Her Burden of Proving That the Law Was Clearlv 
Established Regarding Either Munroe's or Hoagland's Rights. 
As discussed above, it is not clear whose substantive constitutional rights are at issue. 
Regardless, it is Hoagland's burden to establish that the law, as it existed in September 2008, 
was clearly established. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 252 P.3d at 1283. As set forth below, 
Hoagland cannot do so. 
i. The Law Was Not Clearly Established Regarding Munroe's 
Constitutional Rights. 
As for Munroe's constitutional rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that in order 
for an inmate to state a claim under § 1983 for denial of adequate medical treatment, the inmate 
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1992). 
As there are no cases of controlling authority in Idaho regarding a jail social worker 
clearing an adult inmate from suicide watch, Hoagland must be able to point to "a consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority" such that a reasonable jail social worker could not have believed 
that his actions were lawful. As is clear from the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland cannot do so, 
since no such consensus exists. This is because jail suicide cases are regularly dismissed. 
For example, in Rhyne, a deputy jailer found an inmate hanging semi-conscious in his 
cell from a make-shift rope fashioned from his blanket. Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 388. After the 
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inmate returned to the jail from the hospital the next day, he again attempted to hang himself 
with his straight jacket. !d. The inmate was then seen by a mental health worker from the 
outside (the jail had none on staff) who advised he be committed for psychological evaluation. 
Id. at 389. Due to issues regarding legal authority over pretrial detainees, the inmate was not 
transferred. Id. Instead, he was placed (with a blanket) into a cell which could not be clearly 
monitored. Id. Later that day, the inmate's mother and sister visited and the inmate told them he 
would try to kill himself again. Id. The mother then contacted the jail about transferring her son 
to a hospital, but was told to contact a judge. Id. The mother and the inmate's sister claimed 
they informed jail staff of the inmate's repeated threat to kill himself. Id. That evening, the 
inmate hanged himself with a strip of his blanket and eventually died. Id. When the mother later 
sued under § 1983, the court dismissed the matter at summary judgment, determining that the 
facts of the case did not rise to the level of § 1983 liability. Id. at 393. 
Similarly, in Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2010),28 a mental health 
patient with a history of suicidal tendencies was arrested on charges of theft and battery after he 
became separated from his family, who had temporarily checked him out of the State hospital. 
During booking, jail staff noticed scars on his wrist and neck and the inmate admitted to 
attempting suicide in the previous month. Id. A few days later (after having initially been 
placed on suicide watch), a mental health worker who had experience, but no formal licensure, 
visited the inmate. Id. The mental health worker did not review the inmate's medical chart and 
28 Although arising after Munroe's death, this case reflects that even after 2008, such cases are 
regularly dismissed. 
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did not speak to deputies about the inmate's condition, but issued a brief report noting the inmate 
denied suicidal thoughts. Id. The inmate was then taken off suicide watch. Id. Thirty days 
later, the inmate refused his medication and a blade was noted to be missing from his razor. Id. 
He was temporarily placed on suicide watch and then transferred to disciplinary segregation. Id. 
at 828-29. At 4 p.m. the inmate was checked in his cell and then, during the next check at 11 
p.m. (seven (7) hours later), the inmate was found hanging from his bed sheet. Id. at 829. The 
inmate's mother subsequently brought a § 1983 case, criticizing the actions of the jail and 
specifically claiming that the mental health worker's assessment was inadequate. Id. at 83l. 
Again, however, the court determined that pursuant to § 1983 law the facts alleged were 
insufficient to support the § 1983 claims. Id. 
Also helpful is the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416 (6 th 
Cir. 2006), a § 1983 jail suicide case in which the court held that inmate caseworker Roberta 
Rice was "entitled to qualified immunity because no law exists that would clearly establish for a 
person in Rice's position that she was violating [the deceased inmate's] Eighth Amendment 
rights." Id. at 428. Inmate Perez attempted suicide in the jail on November 22, 2002, and died 
four (4) days later from his injuries. Perez had a history of incarcerations at the jail, and had 
multiple contacts with Rice during those times. In 2001, Rice ordered that Perez receive a 
psychiatric evaluation, resulting a diagnosis of schizo affective disorder. Perez, who had also 
been diagnosed with ADHD and as being learning disabled, had a history of experiencing 
hallucinations, hearing voices and of considering suicide, which he attempted in the jail on 
October 25, 2002. On November 18, 2002, Perez met with Rice after a deputy requested that 
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Perez be housed in a single cell as he had been stealing from other inmates in his 10-man cell. 
Perez told Rice that he was no longer taking his medications, since he believed he did not need 
them. Rice found that Perez's "insight appears limited" and "judgment appears poor" but that he 
was stable and did not seem to be suicidal and could be housed in a single cell with no 
supervision. Id. at 422. Four (4) days later, Perez was found hanging from his bed sheet. 
In reaching its decision that the law was not clearly established, the Perez court held that 
even though the general proposition that an official cannot be deliberately indifferent to the 
serious medical needs of an inmate is well-established, that general proposition is not enough, on 
its own, "to alert a reasonable caseworker that Rice's conduct was deliberately indifferent under 
the circumstances." Id. at 428. The court went on to note that, "[b]ecause most legal rights are 
'clearly established' at some level of generality, immunity would be impossible to obtain if a 
plaintiff were required only to cite an abstract legal principle that an official had 'clearly' 
violated.,,29 Id. (citations omitted). 
The difficulty in utilizing § 1983 in the context of jail suicide is also demonstrated by the 
Ninth Circuit in Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 2010), where the parents of 
29 The Perez court also noted that it had previously held that once an inmate is deemed suicidal, 
it is clearly established that the inmate is entitled to continuing medical treatment. Id. at 428. 
However, the court held, because Perez was not deemed to be suicidal by Rice when he was 
moved to a single cell, the law was not clearly established. Id. Such is the case here. Munroe 
was not deemed to be suicidal by Johnson after his assessment on September 29, 2008. R. p. 
2539 (246:17-25); R. p. 2522 (181:7-18). Therefore, the law was not clearly established. The 
Perez court also emphasized that Perez "was not generally deprived of medical treatment 
involving his mental health needs." Perez, 466 F.3d at 428-29. Hoagland does not argue (and 
there is nothing in the Record that would support such an argument) that Munroe was "generally 
deprived of medical treatment involving his mental health needs," since he was seen by a mental 
health professional. 
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a seventeen (17) year-old pretrial detainee, who committed suicide, were not allowed to continue 
their § 1983 litigation against a variety of jail staff, their supervisors, and the County. As stressed 
by the Ninth Circuit, "[0 ]nce a suicide has been accomplished in spite of preventative measures, 
it is all too easy to point out the flaws of fail ure." I d. at 1020. 
In support of her contention that Monroe's rights were clearly established, Hoagland cites 
to Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001). However, that case is easily 
distinguished.30 In Comstock, a prison psychologist removed an inmate from close observation 
and sent him back to his cell without reviewing a battery of psychological tests administered a 
few days prior to the inmate's suicide (Monroe did not have such tests), without reviewing 
medical records (Johnson did review Munroe's medical records, which included an earlier 
assessment by Johnson and a thirty (30) day stay with no concerns raised), without speaking to 
the resident officer who referred the inmate for a psychological consultation (Johnson did speak 
to Wroblewski and the classification deputy), without speaking to the prison guards who daily 
checked on the inmate (Monroe had just arrived at the Jail), without reviewing log entries 
concerning threats against the inmate (Monroe did not have such entries), and without speaking 
to two (2) other psychologists who had met with the inmate (Johnson, the only social worker 
who had met with Monroe, assessed him twice within the last two (2) months». The 
psychologist testified that had he reviewed the above documents and spoken with the deputies 
30 Noteworthy is that Comstock and Perez, supra, both from the Sixth Circuit, have different 
outcomes. The Perez court granted qualified immunity (a more recent case than Comstock) and 
the Comstock court denied it further emphasizing that the law is not clearly established 
regarding the suicide assessments of inmates. 
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and psychologists, he would have learned more information about the inmate and would not have 
removed him from close observational status and would have determined that he was a suicide 
threat. Id. at 707. The Comstock court was particularly troubled that the psychologist did not 
review the inmate's medical file. 3! Here, though, Johnson (who had met with Monroe the month 
before) did review his medical record before meeting with him on September 29, 2008. R. p. 
137,' 17; R. p. 2509 (126:19-25); R. p. 2535 (230:8-25). And, importantly, Johnson testified 
that even if he had known that Monroe would be placed in a cell alone, he would not have 
changed his assessment. R. p. 2539 (246:22-25, 247: 1-4). 
As the discussion above shows, suicide cases are dismissed regularly. At the very least, 
though, a review of the suicide cases cited by both the parties shows different courts (sometimes 
in the same Circuit) reaching different outcomes based on the unique facts presented to them. As 
this Court noted in Miller, 
[i]t is difficult enough to expect a reasonable police officer to differentiate 
between cases in which officers were allowed to hold down a suspect at the 
border and search his rectal cavity for heroin ... or a case in which police were 
allowed to pump a suspect's stomach after he admitted swallowing crack cocaine 
on a public street. .. from a case wherein officers could not pump a suspect's 
stomach to retrieve two suspicious capsules he swallowed in front of them during 
an illegal home search .... 
l'11iller, 150 Idaho at 868,252 P.3d at 1286 (citations omitted). 
The same analysis is applicable here. It would be quite difficult to expect a reasonable 
jail social worker to differentiate between suicide cases where sometimes qualified immunity 
3! Contrast the Comstock court's denial of qualified immunity based on a failure to review 
medical files with the Minix court's granting of qualified immunity to a mental health worker 
who also failed to review medical files. 
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was granted and sometimes it was not, particularly when a federal Circuit appellate court 
specifically finds that the law is not clearly established. As in Miller, the law regarding suicide 
assessments by jail social workers "is too undeveloped, and the applicable legal principles too 
uncertain," to hold Johnson personally liable in this case. ld. 869, 1287. Since the law was not 
clearly established, Johnson's dismissal based on qualified immunity should be upheld. 
ii. The Law Was Not Clearly Established Regarding Hoagland's 
Constitutional Rights. 
If this Court determines that the focus should be on the violation of Hoagland's own 
rights instead of Munroe's, the law is still not clearly established. The act of creating a new 
constitutional right in Hoagland's favor provides qualified immunity protection to Johnson, since 
Hoagland must not only demonstrate that a constitutional right was violated, but that the right in 
question was "clearly established" by applicable law prior to the defendant's actions. See, 
Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). Logic dictates that a right cannot have been 
"clearly established" regarding Hoagland's own rights if the cause of action was just created. 
Hoagland argues that Johnson was on notice that he could be sued under § 1983 by 
Munroe's heirs, and cites Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986) in support 
of this contention.32 However, this case does not stand for that proposition. In Strandberg, the 
parents of their adult child who killed himself in jail mistakenly thought that the trial court 
dismissed them as parties, and thus appealed that decision. ld. at 748. The Ninth Circuit found 
that while the trial court did dismiss the Strandberg's "right to parent" claim (since their child 
32 The Defendants contend that this cause of action is no longer valid in the United States. See 
Cross-Appellants' Brief, Section A, pp. 2-9. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 35 
was an adult), the trial court did not dismiss their Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding a right 
to companionship and society, resulting in the Strandbergs remaining as parties to the action. 
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the merits of that claim. 
Hoagland also references Idaho Code §§ 5-311, 5-327 and 15-1-201 as putting Johnson 
on notice that he could be sued by a parent for his conduct. Appellant's Brief, p. 42. However, 
these statutes pertain to \vrongful death and negligence causes of action brought under state law, 
and certainly would not give anyone notice that his or her actions toward an adult could 
constitute a § 1983 constitutional violation of the rights of that adult's parent. 
Johnson's dismissal was therefore correct, as the constitutional rights at stake are not only 
unclear, but also the law regarding such rights is not clearly established. Johnson could not have 
been on notice that his thoughtful assessment of Munroe would somehow violate Hoagland's 
constitutional rights. However, even if this Court finds that the applicable law was clearly 
established regarding Munroe or Hoagland's rights,33 Johnson is still entitled to qualified 
immunity, as he did not act with deliberate indifference towards Munroe when he conducted a 
suicide assessment and determined, after thoughtful consideration, that Munroe was not at 
imminent risk for suicide. 
33 If this Court finds that the law was clearly established regarding Hoagland's rights, Johnson 
still could not have violated Hoagland's constitutional rights, since it is unclear what standard 
would be applied in making this determination it would, however, be a standard other than 
deliberate indifference. The Defendants therefore are not in a position to conduct an analysis 
regarding whether Johnson violated Hoagland's constitutional rights. 
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iii. If This Court Finds That the Law Was Clearly Established, Johnson 
Did Not Act With Deliberate Indifference Towards A1unroe. 
When Munroe committed suicide, he was a pretrial detainee. 34 To state a constitutional 
claim regarding medical care, an inmate (or pretrial detainee) must show that a jail official's 
"acts or omissions [were] sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A jail official cannot be liable for 
deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs unless the official "knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837(1994). "If a [jail official] 
should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth 
Amendment, no matter how severe the risk." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 
2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
"[A] plaintiffs showing of nothing more than 'a difference of medical opinion' as to the 
need to pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish deliberate indifference." Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, '" [m Jere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical 
34 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment's 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, generally applies to pretrial detainees in county 
jails. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n. 16 (1979). However, the same standards are applied 
in both instances. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017. 
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condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.'" Toguchi,391 
F.3d at 1057 (citations omitted). 
Specifically in jail suicide cases, deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show 
"that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at substantial risk of committing 
suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk." Minix, 597 F.3d at 831 (citations omitted). 
The defendant must have had actual knowledge of the significant likelihood that the deceased 
would take his life. Id. at 832. It is not enough that there was a danger that the official, "should 
have been aware, rather, the official must both be aware of a set of facts from which the 
substantial risk of serious harm may be drawn, and he must also draw that inference." Id. at 
831-32 (emphasis added). Further, there is no right to be screened correctly for suicidal 
tendencies. Comstock, 273 F.3d at 702. 
Therefore, in order for Hoagland to prove that Johnson was deliberately indifferent 
towards Munroe, she must show that Johnson was subjectively aware that Munroe would likely 
commit suicide and that he was intentionally indifferent to this outcome. Hoagland can do 
neither, as the Record is void of any such evidence, as recognized by the District Court. 35 
When reviewing the Record it is helpful to examine three (3) main areas of significance-
Johnson's actual assessment of Munroe on September 29, 2008, Munroe's PC request that 
35 One of the most important considerations to keep in mind when reviewing immunity cases is 
that these cases cannot be analyzed with the luxury of hindsight. The parties and this Court 
know that Munroe took his life on September 29,2008. Looking backward from September 29, 
2008 to every action and interaction between Johnson and Munroe is a natural response. But 
being aware of Munroe's eventual actions makes us omnipotent in hindsight. Analyzing the 
facts of this matter in that light is not fair since Johnson did not have our after-acquired 
knowledge. 
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resulted in his housing in Cellblock 7, and Hoagland's phone call to the Jail. It is also helpful to 
review the Defendants' expert witnesses testimony, as well as Hoagland's own expert. 
a) Johnson's Assessment of Munroe. 
Johnson had the opportunity to assess Munroe twice while at the Jail -- once on 
September 1, 2008, and again on September 29, 2008. During his deposition, Johnson testified 
at length about the September 29,2008 assessment, describing it in great detail: 
You know, that morning, clearly, they had called specifically about suicide. So, 
you know, the idea is: Here you have a guy who you've seen before, who you 
knew to be taking medicine, knew to have a number of the risk factors which 
we'd talked about. So that's kind of in your head. 
But so I just went in, kind of watched. And he was cooperating, and talking to 
them, and just sort of going through the motions fairly well with -- you know, 
there's a lot of structure to that process itself, deputies giving him directions 
about, you know, right finger, two fingers, four fingers, thumb, you know, that 
kind of stuff you do on live scan-in? 
So, obviously, clearly able to follow directions and do what he's told .... So, yep, 
he can handle that pretty well. And so, you know - and so I just kind of walk up 
then and talk to - and greet him, talk to him. 
The ultimate point is: Let's make some kind of assessment of whether this guy 
looks like imminent suicide risk. He's a troubled kid, he's had treatment. Let's 
see what we need to do now. 
Because there's a few things that happen. In the mental health treatment setting, 
in the medical infirmary, you, essentially -- when you go on suicide status, you, 
essentially, lose everything. 
You don't get a chance to talk to people, you don't get a chance to move around. 
You don't get a chance to wear clothes, initially, usually, if you're on the yellow 
suicide status, which is our sort of highest-level suicide watch. You don't have 
any element of normalcy. 
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So the question is: Here's this troubled young kid, with reasonable social skills. 
And most people, in most environments, obviously, aren't going to want to - even 
though sometimes you have to put them there -- be in a situation where they don't 
have easy access to phone when they want it, they don't get to eat food in a 
normal service, they don't get to wear clothes, they don't get to move around the 
dorm or holding-tank setting very well, there's no playing cards, there's no 
talking, there's no whatever, you're just stuck in a room by yourself, which can 
be isolating and difficult. 
So do you want -let's go in and see ifhe looks like he's in a place where he can 
interact with people, he's -- you know, where is he in terms of his level of 
desperation, level of despondency, his ability to commit to being safe and okay in 
the jail. So that's all kind of in the background of your head. 
So, you know, I just came in, tried to open up conversation with him. He was 
pleasant enough, in that he looked over at me, he did his tasks, and would look 
and was talking for those for just a brief amount of minutes. And it's like, 
"Well, that was when I came in, but you know, and I was being stupid. But 
right now, I - you know, I'm not suicidal. I don't really have any need for mental 
health services.,,36 
So you can't just walk away, without trying to figure out: Okay, so there's a little 
push away. It's a -- but I'm not going to let myself get disarmed by this. Let's see 
if there's something else, some other way I might, through my own body 
language, relaxation or -- you know, not getting sort of thwarted by my own 
initial rejection, some way to help me engage and talk about a little bit more. 
So probably, again, some efforts at, you know, "You were here last time. We 
talked a little bit about medications. If you're going to be in the jail for awhile-" 
you know, these are -- this is my supposition about kind of knowing, myself, if a 
19-year-old kid's just kind of like, "Nope, don't need ya. I'm fine. I'm good," 
you know, sort of at least talking around, is there some way I can get him to think 
- you know, "You were on medicines last time you were here. Are you going to 
want to see the doctor or have us restart them? Or is there some way that we 
could bring those, get those brought back in for you again?" 
36 This is supported by Wroblewski's testimony regarding Johnson's assessment of Munroe: 
"And I do remember that Mr. Munroe didn't really want to answer him and he told him, I don't 
want your help. And then Jim Johnson said, okay, I'll respect your wishes. That's what I 
remember." R. p. 3289 (34:3-10). 
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And I, essentially, didn't get anywhere, not from the standpoint of him rejecting 
me hostilely, but just - just sort of, you know, "No, I'm really not going to want 
those services." So he sort of, kind of put it to an end. 
During that time, any time that I'm talking, thinking, listening to his answers, I'm 
just watching him .... 
In spite of the fact that he had [been] pretty agitated, one might say, odd, difficult 
behaviors the night before, and had a history that included a number of risk 
factors for harming himself, he had a calm demeanor, was cooperative and 
pleasant with deputies, even though, when he first came in the building, he 
wasn't, Clearly, able to concentrate, look, listen, and respond in a respectful, kind 
of calm tone, without being sort of sarcastic, and bad, nasty, rude, whatever, and 
didn't look to be in any terrible distress. 
And a question he's been asked before and knows sort of the outcome to, it's 
clear, you know, "Well, then are you going to -" "So what you're telling me is 
that you'll keep yourself safe while you're here in the jail? You can tell me that 
you're going to do that?" 
And, you know, looking right at me, he said, "Yeah. Yeah, that's not - I can do 
that. " 
But we were just talking directly to each other, he gave me sort of the verbal 
assurance that, "Yeah, I'll keep myself safe in the jail. That's not the that's not 
the thing at this point right now." 
So I think about -- you know, I take that -- the risk factors, the history, those sorts 
of things, into play, and look at the overall sort of calm, not irritated, agitated 
demeanor, the consideration of how does somebody sort of integrate into the jail, 
talk to some people they've seen there before, kind of hang out, pass time with 
people .... You know, sort of how does he start to pull into jail. And does he look 
like he's someone who can do that, is he -- sometimes we even put people in 
medical just because they're like deer in the headlights, like "Ahhhhhhh," you 
know, they've just never been in jail before and it's just the whole thing 
overwhelms them, they don't know what to do. 
He, clearly, looked quite comfortable, and was assuring for safety. 
R. pp. 2521-2522 (174:4-25 -- 180:1-24). 
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Based on this assessment (and with his twenty (20) years of experience), Johnson cleared 
Mumoe for general housing. Johnson placed emphasis on the need for inmates to be able to 
make choices about certain areas of their lives, which in a jail setting is limited to health care, 
including mental health, and that inmates have the right to refuse mental health services or 
treatment. R. p. 2494 (66:21-25, 67:1-4); R. p. 2503 (103:4-8). 
Johnson was clear that after each of his interviews with Mumoe, he did not believe 
Mumoe would harm himself. Johnson's actions, chart notes, statements and testimony are 
consistent with his belief that Mumoe was not likely to commit suicide on September 29,2008. 
(1) Hoagland Misrepresents Johnson's Testimony. 
In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland forwards that, "In explaining what he meant when he 
used the specific term 'intent' in his documentation of his September 29, 2008 suicide 
assessment of Bradley Mumoe, Johnson testified that he knew Bradley was planning and 
wanting to hurt himself," and cites to several pages of Johnson's deposition transcript, focusing 
on the words, "I know that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt himself." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 49. Once again, Hoagland focuses on a few choice sentences taken out of context, 
resulting in a complete misrepresentation of Johnson's actual testimony. The line of questioning 
by Hoagland's counsel actually involved Johnson's understanding of Mumoe's past 
hospitalization at Intermountain. Hoagland's counsel posed the question, "On the 29th , when you 
were done speaking with Bradley, was it your understanding that he'd been hospitalized at 
Intermountain for making statements that he was going to commit suicide or an actual 
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attempt?,,37 R. p. 2537 (240:14-17). The next two (2) pages of testimony consist of Johnson's 
answer to that question, with Johnson explaining the meaning of the word "intent" in the context 
of suicide, and that since he VvTote the word "intent," he knew Munroe had been serious in the 
past regarding suicide. R. p. 2537 (240:21-25, 241:1-25, 242:1-7). 
b) Munroe's Protective Custody Request. 
While being escorted to his cell after Johnson's assessment, Munroe told Deputy 
Donelson that he was in danger in the Jail because people wanted to harm him. During his 
deposition, Deputy Donelson testified that inmates frequently request protective custody - most 
commonly because of danger to them from drug deals that have not gone well or because of their 
gang affiliation -- without giving details. 38 R. p. 2445 (42:14-23). 
It is important to note that neither Donelson nor classification deputy Drinkall testified 
that Munroe was exhibiting "strange behavior," or that either of them had any "concern" about 
Munroe's behavior. Moreover, Donelson testified that Munroe was in good spirits when he 
escorted him into Cellblock 7. R. p. 2444 (39:9-19). Munroe seemed like any other inmate 
just normal, not anxious, not hyper, not loud, not quiet, and not sad. 39 R. p. 2445 (41: 14-17). 
37 In actuality, Munroe was admitted to Intermountain Hospital from August 4, 2008, to August 
5, 2008, because he went off his medications and was abusing alcohol and marijuana, and not for 
a suicide attempt. R. p. 3851 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 7). 
38 For these reasons, an inmate requesting protective custody is neither "unusual" nor "strange" 
in a jail. R. p. 2366, ~ 5. On any given day, between fifteen (15) and twenty (20) inmates are 
housed in protective custody at the Jail, which is indicative of an inmate's concern for his/her 
own well-being. Jd. at ~ 6. 
39 Noteworthy, while conducting a standing head count of Cellblock 7 sometime after 7:00 p.m. 
on September 29, 2008, nearly twelve (J 2) hours after Johnson's assessment, Deputy Kevin 
Manning entered Munroe's cell to check on him. R. p. 171, ~~ 5,7. Manning stated that Munroe 
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When Donelson brought Munroe to Cellblock 7, the inmates housed there started joking with 
Munroe, laughing, saying "hi," and "what are you doing back?" R. p. 2444 (38:1-21). Munroe 
joked with them and talked to them. Jd. Munroe seemed happy to Donelson. R. p. 2444 (39:9-
11). Donelson explained that nothing about Munroe struck him as out of the ordinary the 
morning of September 29, 2008. R. p. 2445 (43:18-23). 
Deputy Drinkall testified that he spoke with Johnson after assIgnmg Munroe to a 
protective custody cell. R. p. 2380 (22:13-24); R. p. 2381 (28:4-9). Drinkalliogged: "I spoke 
with Jim Johnson about Munroe. Johnson did already talk to Munroe this morning in booking. 
He said Munroe was not suicidal but very agitated.,,4o R. p. 2379 (19:5-19); R. p. 2380 (21:20-
25,22:1-7). 
Johnson testified that when he left work the night of September 29, 2008, "it wasn't in 
my head that Mr. Munroe, who I had met with and cleared from suicide watch, was in a cell by 
himself somewhere." R. p. 2539 (246: 17-20). "I did not know that he was going to be alone.,,4! 
R. p. 2538 (245:11-12). This is because at the time, Johnson did not exactly understand what the 
side chute and protective custody entailed. R. p. 2538 (244:23-25, 245:1-12). Since at that time 
he was fairly new to the Jail, Johnson did not have a complete understanding of the layout and 
seemed fine, and even asked Manning if he could remove Munroe's empty dinner tray from his 
cell. Jd. 
40 In his deposition testimony, Johnson explains that he probably would have told Drinkall that 
Munroe was agitated the night before (referring to September 28, 2008, the night Munroe was 
arrested), but on the morning of September 29, "he is presenting as calm, and not suicidal, 
denying suicidal ideation, contracting for safety." R. p. 2533 (224:24-25,225:1-16). 
41 "The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's 
error is a 'mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and 
fact. '" Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citations omitted). 
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terminology used at the Jail. ld. Regardless, had he known that Munroe would have been 
housed alone, Johnson did not believe that he would have made any major adjustment or a 
change in his assessment. 42 R. p. 2539 (246:22-25, 247:1-4). 
c) Telephone Call From Rita Hoagland. 
Johnson testified regarding his understanding of the phone call that took place between 
Hoagland and Robertson the morning of September 29,2008: 
There my understanding was that there was some concern on his mother's part, 
based on some communication from Brad, that he was suicidal, that he had a 
history of treatment in suicide attempts. I think Leslie actually conveyed all of 
those things to me, some of which I knew. I mean, my very involvement with 
him that morning was based on the fact that, at some point, he had identified 
himself as suicidal. 
R. p. 2507 (121:1-9). 
Johnson explained that these types of calls are quite common in the Jail. R. p. 2507 
(121: 15-17). Johnson further explained that the information conveyed by Hoagland was another 
factor he considered that morning, which came from a collateral person who was also concerned 
for Munroe, and that collateral information is critical. R. p. 2505 (113:11-12); R. p. 2507 
(113 :21-23). Johnson went on to explain that even though he did not call Hoagland back,43 "the 
fact that [Munroe] was suicidal, had a history of hospitalizations and treatment were all things I 
42 Though this does not appear to be a situation involving an overt misunderstanding, to the 
extent any miscommunication occurred between Johnson and Drinkall, as the District Court 
noted, "[ m ]iscommunication among employees charged with caring for suicidal inmates is often 
not enough to show deliberate indifference." R. p. 2340. 
43 Johnson was unaware if Hoagland had left a phone number for a return call (R. p. 2539 (249:4-
9, 251 :3-9)), but explained that he just saw Munroe for a suicide assessment, and also would 
have needed Munroe's permission to speak to Hoagland regarding his mental health, since 
Munroe was over eighteen (18). R. p. 2539 (249: 11-25), R. p. 2540 (250: 1-25). 
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was aware of at the time of his assessment; but, obviously, confirmed by his mother, as well, by 
that phone call." R. p. 2507 (121:24-25); R. p. 2508 (122:1-6). This information was consistent 
with what Johnson already knew about Munroe. R. p. 2508 (123:21-24). 
The testimony above shows that Johnson's subjective knowledge was that Munroe was 
not at imminent risk for suicide. As set forth below, the testimony of the Jail's psychiatrist and 
the reports of the Defendants' expert witnesses support Johnson's thoughts. 
d) Michael Estess, M.D. 
Dr. Michael Estess has been the Jail contract psychiatrist since the 1970's, and in 2008 he 
worked with Johnson. R. p. 2397 (4:12-23). In Dr. Estess' opinion, Johnson was a conscientious 
and competent social worker, and Johnson's decision in this case was based on his clinical 
judgment. R. p. 2412 (63:1-2); R. pp. 2412-2414 (62:3-25 - 70:1-25). When Dr. Estess was 
notified about Munroe's suicide, he asked Johnson difficult questions about Johnson's 
assessment of Munroe. Id. Dr. Estess found that Johnson purposefully gathered and considered 
all the information, had a basis for the decision he made and thought he made the right decision. 
Id. Johnson felt like he had a relationship with Munroe, and because he had met with and made 
a previous assessment, this history with Munroe led him to his determination. Id. 
e) Leslie Lundt, M.D. 
Dr. Leslie Lundt, a longtime Boise psychiatrist currently residing in California, reviewed 
voluminous records about Munroe, including the social background regarding Munroe's 
interaction with his mother, his father, his mother's boyfriend and his mother's current husband. 
R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, pp. 1-14.) Dr. Lundt looked not only at Munroe's few 
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days in the Ada County Jail, but at all of his nineteen (19) years. Id. Based on her global 
consideration of Munroe, her opinion is that "the Ada County Jail personnel responded 
appropriately" to Munroe. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 16.) She points out that 
when Munroe, "sobered up, he denied suicidal ideation when asked directly by Mr. Johnson 
(who had kno'wn his baseline from his previous incarceration) and stated that he was not 
interested in receiving mental health services at the jail. Despite this, he was placed in an 
environment where he could be checked every 30 minutes." Jd. Dr. Lundt continued: Munroe's 
suicide was "an unplanned, impulsive gesture that could not have been predicted by jail 
personnel." Id. Munroe had an extensive history of impulse control problems and poor 
decision-making that ultimately led to his death.44 Id. 
f) Charles Novak, M.D. 
Boise psychiatrist Dr. Charles Novak also reviewed extensive records about Munroe's 
life, then opined, "the treatment provided by the Ada County Jail was well within the community 
standards of care." R. p. 3851, Ex. 7 (Novak Aff., Ex. A., p. 1, 2.) Dr. Novak further 
commented that Munroe had access to mental health professionals, medications and social 
assistance and intervention at the Jail. R. p. 3851, Ex. 7 (Novak Aff., Ex. A., p. 2.) Dr. Novak 
believes Munroe's suicide was not preventable, given that his risks were not treatable. Id. Dr. 
Novak saw no deliberate indifference on the part of the Jail staff. ld. 
44 The Jail telephone calls placed by Munroe the morning of September 29, 2008, are not in 
evidence. However, if this Court considers Hoagland's references to the calls, this Court should 
consider Dr. Lundt's thoughts regarding the phone calls - there was no evidence of psychotic 
symptoms or significantly changed demeanor from his previous calls. Id. He talked of making 
plans for the future, which is not expected in someone who is actively suicidal. ld. 
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g) Brian Mecham, LCSW 
Brian Mecham is a licensed clinical social worker with experience as a clinical director of 
mental health over ten (10) Idaho jails. R. p. 3851, Ex. 5 (Mecham Aff., Ex. A.). Mecham .states 
that the assessments by Johnson were acceptable and appropriate. Id. Mecham explains that he 
has conducted hundreds of this sort of interview and knows much can be learned in a short 
amount of time. Id. (Mecham Aff., Ex. A). Mecham is adamant that Johnson did not act with 
deliberate indifference toward Munroe. Id. (Mecham Aff., Ex. A). 
h) Daniel Kennedy, Ph.D., LMSW 
Dr. Daniel Kennedy is both a criminologist and a licensed social worker. R. p. 3851, Ex. 
3 (Kennedy Aff., Ex. A, pp. 1, 2). As an expert witness in suicide litigation, Dr. Kelmedy 
explains suicide is extremely difficult, if not impossible to predict. Id. (Kennedy Aff., Ex. A, pp. 
5-7). It is a rare event, and that lends to the difficulty of studying it. Id. Conversely, 
overreacting to an inmate's threats, and wrongly placing him or her on a suicide watch may -
because of the austere and dehumanizing nature of such a watch actually worsen the emotional 
state of the inmate. Id. (Kennedy Aff., Ex. A, p. 7). Proper mental health care, then, must strike 
a balance. Id. Given the factors and circumstances involved, as well as Munroe's outright denial 
of current suicidal ideation and his right to refuse treatment, Dr. Kennedy explains Johnson's 
decisions about Munroe fell within the range of reasonable professional discretion. Id. (Kennedy 
Aff., Ex. A, p. 8). 
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i) Hoagland's Expert, Dr. Thomas White 
Dr. White, a psychologist retired from the federal prison system, also admits that suicide 
cannot be predicted. R. p. 2185 (143:17-25, 144:1-2). He further admits that he cannot 
determine what people are thinking, let alone that they subjectively knew Mumoe would likely 
commit suicide, as is required to prove deliberate indifference. 45 R. p. 2191 (168: 15-21). 
Dr. White focuses on matters such as whether Jail staff conformed to a standard of care46 
and gathered sufficient information to make informed judgments. R. p. 2192 (172:6-17). 
Though this may be relevant in a state tort action, under § 1983 the question is not whether a 
defendant should have done more to become aware of an inmate's risk of suicide. Even if a 
defendant should have been aware of the risk, but did not, they have not violated the inmate's 
civil rights, no matter how severe the risk. See, Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (9th eir. 2004) 
(emphasis added). There is simply no evidence in this case that Johnson knew that Munroe 
would likely commit suicide and acted indifferently to that outcome. Moreover, Dr. White's 
conclusory statements on the subject lack basis in law and in fact. 
What the Record does show is that Johnson has done a suicide risk assessment on every 
patient he has seen for nearly thirty (30) years. R. p. 2490 (50:23-25); R. p. 2491 (51:1-2); R. p. 
2537 (239:15-21). Utilizing his clinical judgment, Johnson conducted a well thought out 
assessment of Munroe, including the consideration of additional information presented to him 
45 In fact, Dr. White does not have a correct understanding of the term deliberate indifference. R. 
p. 2192 (173 :20-25); R. p. 2193 (174: 1-4). His definition does not conform to case law. 
46 Dr. White nevertheless admits there are no standards regarding matters such as how to assess 
suicide. R. p. 2164 (59:15-20). 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 49 
throughout the mornmg of September 29, 2008. Johnson explains that Munroe's actions, 
statements and outward demeanor on the mornmg of September 29, 2008, were contrary 
indicators to suicide. Johnson's thoughts and actions are consistent with his clinical judgment 
and belief that Munroe would not harm himself. 
As such, the District Court's dismissal of Johnson should stand, both because the law was 
not clearly established, and because Johnson was not deliberately indifferent to Munroe. 
C. The District Court Properly Granted Deputy Wroblewski Summary Judgment by 
Finding That He Was Not Deliberately Indifferent to Munroe.47 
As argued below, the Record supports the District Court's finding that Wroblewski was 
not deliberately indifferent to Munroe, and as such, his dismissal should be upheld. 
1. The District Court Correctly Applied the Standard of Deliberate Indifference. 48 
47 The Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity with the District Court regarding 
Wroblewski. The District Court did not rule specifically on this defense, but did ultimately rule 
that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent to Munroe. Nonetheless, the Defendants 
continue to maintain that Wroblewski is entitled to qualified immunity. 
48 Hoagland asserts that, "the trial court applied the wrong definition of deliberate indifference to 
Ms. Hoagland's claims." Appellant's Brief, p. 34. She appears to take issue with the District 
Court's citation to the Ninth Circuit in Minix, which holds that it must be shown that the 
defendant, "( 1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at substantial risk of committing suicide and 
(2) intentionally disregarded the risk." Minix, 597 F.3d at 831. In particular, Hoagland focuses 
on the word "intentionally" and argues that a plaintiff does not need to make such a showing. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 35. She supports this contention with a string cite in a footnote. These 
cases, though, do not support her contention. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Clouthier v. 
County o/Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010), states that, "there is insufficient evidence 
to establish that Foley was subjectively aware that his failure to communicate Blush's 
instructions to other deputies constituted a substantial risk of serious harm to Clouthier, and 
deliberately ignored that risk." ld. at 1248 (emphasis added). Further, Wever v. Lincoln County, 
Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601 (8 th Cir. 2004) and Bradich v. City a/Chicago, 413 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 
2005) do not address the issue of individual deliberate indifference, and do not set forth a 
definition. Dorman v. District a/Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1989) is a Monell case 
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In order for Hoagland to prove that Wroblewski was deliberately indifferent towards 
Munroe, she must show that Wroblewski was subjectively aware that Munroe would likely 
commit suicide and that he was intentionally indifferent to this outcome. As is the case with 
Johnson, Hoagland can do neither, as properly recognized by the District Court.49 
In finding that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent, the District Court held: 
To be granted summary judgment the record must show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether Wroblewski acted in a way that 
constituted deliberate indifference. After careful review of the record, and 
drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Ms. Hoagland's favor, the Court 
finds that Wroblewski was subjectively aware of a serious medical need, but that 
he did not fail to adequately respond to that need. He did what he understood he 
should do in the circumstances; his failure to notify the HSU of Munroe's answers 
is understandable considering the unfortunate timing of Johnson's assessment of 
Munroe coupled with the fact that Wroblewski was still in training. In retrospect, 
he should have notified the HSU, however, as other courts have observed, once a 
suicide has been accomplished in spite of preventative measures, it is all too easy 
to point out the flaws of failure. And those flaws cannot be the basis for a finding 
of fault. 
R. p. 2347. 
that discusses the need for a "conscious choice" in order to rise to the level of deliberate 
indifference on the part of a municipality. 
49 In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland argues at length that the District Court granted Wroblewski 
summary judgment on an issue "not properly raised or supported by his Restated Motion for 
Summary Judgment." Appellant's Brief, p. 22- 26. This argument is a red herring, since the 
Defendants clearly argued that Wroblewski was entitled to qualified immunity in their 
Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary Judgment CR. pp. 1683-1690), and 
again in their Reply Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary Judgment CR. pp. 
2265-2274), a component of which is whether Wroblewski was deliberately indifferent to 
Munroe. 
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As evidenced by the above-cited language, the District Court conducted a thorough 
review of the Record and correctly found that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent to 
Munroe. Hoagland raises no legitimate issues on appeal that change this outcome. 
2. There Is No Evidence in the Record That Wroblewski Was Deliberatelv 
Indifferent Towards Munroe. 
Hoagland argues that the District Court misread the Record regarding Wroblewski's 
interactions with Munroe. However, as argued below, the District Court correctly reiterated the 
facts, but to the extent any misstatements occurred, this constitutes harmless error by the District 
Court, which has no bearing on its ultimate finding that Wroblewski did not violate Munroe's 
constitutional rights. "This Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is harmless .... 
[I]f an error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result of the 
trial, the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 
Idaho 552, ---,261 P.3d 829,836 (2011). 
a. Wroblewski Did Not Know That A1unroe Would Likely Commit Suicide. 
There is no evidence in the Record that Wroblewski knew that Munroe would likely 
commit suicide. 5o In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland conveniently focuses on carefully chosen 
segments of the Record while ignoring critical components of the evidence, resulting in an 
incomplete picture of what really occurred between Wroblewski and Munroe, and Wroblewski's 
state of mind the morning of September 29,2008. 
50 Even though the District Court found that "Wroblewski was subjectively aware of a serious 
medical need," (R. p. 2347) this is not the same as a finding that Wroblewski had actual 
knowledge of the significant likelihood that Munroe would take his life. Minix, 597 F.3d at 832. 
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Hoagland focuses on Wroblewski's training and that, in her opinion, the District Court, 
"misunderstood the extent of Wroblewski's training and his understanding of the Jail's suicide 
risk prevention policies." Appellant's Brief, p. 33. The District Court correctly noted that on 
September 29, 2008, Wroblewski was in his last week of on-the-job training at the Jai1. 5] R. p. 
2324. Further, the District Court correctly noted that Wroblewski was "new on the job," that 
Wroblewski's trainer was present during Munroe's booking process, "and did not indicate to 
Wroblewski that [he] needed to further follow up" regarding Munroe's answers to the suicide 
risk assessment questions. 52 R. p. 2347. 
Hoagland also focuses on the Social Stress/Suicide Risk Questionnaire that Wroblewski 
completed with Munroe at approximately 8:26 a.m. that morning. Appellant's Brief, p. 29-30. 
Hoagland points to the suicide risk questions to which Munroe answered "yes," but Hoagland 
left out Munroe's critical answer to Wroblewski's question, "Are you currently thinking about 
5] Hoagland is correct that Wroblewski had more experience than was expressly noted by the 
District Court (however, not specifically noting all of Wroblewski's experience does not mean 
that the District Court discounted such experience) - which makes his thoughts about Munroe's 
suicide risk even more credible. Prior to joining the Jail as a commissioned deputy, Wroblewski 
was a corrections officer for two (2) years for the Idaho Department of Correction at the Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution, although he was not charged with the task of performing suicide 
screening. R. p. 3282 (7:2-25, 8:1-14). Prior to that, Wroblewski served in Iraq for eighteen 
(18) months in the Army Reserves. R. p. 3282 (8:15-25); R. p. 3283 (9:1-2). Wroblewski 
attended POST twicc, where he would have received training on suicide risk reduction. R. p. 
3283 (9: 13-25, 10: 1-22). 
52 Hoagland states that there is nothing in the Record to support this finding. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 34. However, Wroblewski's testimony indicates that although Wroblewski did not recall 
whether his trainer was actually in the room when Munroe answered the questions, he was 
certainly in the immediate vicinity, and was available to answer any questions Wroblewski might 
have had. R. pp. 3283, 3298. There is no testimony that Wroblewski's trainer required him to 
do anything further. 
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suicide?" R. p. 142, ~ 8; R. p. 3291 (42:23-25,43:1-14). To this question, Munroe responded, 
"that he was thinking about suicide earlier but not now." Jd. As testified to in his deposition, 
Wroblewski agreed that whether Munroe was thinking about suicide currently or in the past was 
important in determining whether he was at risk for suicide. R. p. 3291 (43:4-15). 
Hoagland also focuses on Wroblewski's perception of Munroe's appearance during the 
booking process. 53 Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-32. Hoagland notes that in the Visual Observations 
portion of the Initial Classification, Temporary Cell Assignment questionnaire, Wroblewski 
"noted that Bradley's appearance was 'poor' and he looked sick, smelled of alcohol and 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol." Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-32. However, 
Hoagland again fails to give this Court the complete picture. Regarding Munroe's appearance as 
being "poor," Wroblewski explained at his deposition that Munroe appeared to have had too 
much to drink, and that he was hung over. R. p. 3293 (52:5-15). Regarding Munroe "smelling 
of alcohol" and "appearing to be under the influence of alcohol," Wroblewski again explained 
that Munroe was not under the influence of alcohol, but was instead hung over: 
Q. Okay. Would you say Bradley was intoxicated when you were talking to 
him about all this stuff, or was he just hung over? 
A. I would say that he was hung over. I I don't know. He he wasn't like 
falling over himself drunk. 
Q. But he still smelled like alcohol? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Were there aspects of his demeanor that suggested to you that he 
was under the influence of alcohol still? 
A. No, just just the odor. 
Q. Just the odor? 
53 Noteworthy is Wroblewski's observation that Munroe's behavior did not suggest the need for 
immediate psychiatric treatment. R. p. 3294 (53:13-16). 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF PAGE 54 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was hung over? 
A. That's what it seemed like to me, yes. 
R. p. 3302 (85:7-22). 
Hoagland also emphasizes that Munroe told Wroblewski he was on Celexa, but 
Wroblewski testified that he did not (and still did not at the time of his deposition) know what 
Celexa was, making this an irrelevant point. R. p. 3294 (54:9-15). 
Hoagland also focuses on Munroe's answer that he was seemg VISIons and hearing 
VOIces. Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Hoagland once again omits Wroblewski's explanation: "He 
didn't he didn't seem out of it at all like if for lack ofa better term. He understood all of the 
questions I was asking him. He wasn't saying anything weird except for that he sometimes sees 
shadow people and that they're - they tell him to run. ,,54 R. p. 3296 (61 :2-7). Wroblewski 
testified that Munroe followed his directions and was cooperative during the fingerprinting and 
questionnaire processes, and did not seem confused. R. p. 3290 (38:22-25); R. p. 3291 (42:2-9); 
R. p. 3295 (60:24-25). Munroe seemed annoyed and angry that he was in jail, but Wroblewski 
testified that everybody seems angry when they are in jail. R. p. 3290 (39:2-4); R. p. 3289 
(33:21-23); R. p. 3295 (59:15-22). 
54 Hoagland cites to Jail phone calls made by Munroe the morning of September 29, 2008. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 48. However, these phone calls were not admitted into evidence or 
considered by the District Court. R. p. 3493. To the extent this Court will consider the phone 
calls, it should be noted that Munroe stated to his girlfriend that he wanted Thorazine to make 
him feel better that morning, and the only way he could get it was to tell the Jail staff he was 
seeing visions and hearing voices. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, pp. 11-12); R. p. 3851, ~ 
3. 
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Wroblewski's testimony is clear that he did not believe Munroe was likely to commit 
suicide when he was booked on the morning of September 29, 2008. Wroblewski was therefore 
not deliberately indifferent to Munroe that morning. 
b. Even if Wroblewski Did Know, There Is No Evidence That He Was 
Intentionally Indifferent to This Outcome. 
Hoagland appears to place the greatest emphasis on Wroblewski not contacting the HSU 
after answering "yes" to the question, "Does the inmate's behavior suggest a risk of suicide?" 
Hoagland concludes that, "Wroblewski told no one that Bradley appeared to be at risk of 
committing suicide, and took no action to abate the risk." Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Once again, 
Hoagland conveniently leaves out crucial components of the picture. 
Wroblewski began Munroe's booking at 8:00 a.m. on September 29, 2008. R. p. 3298 
(69:5-13). Wroblewski's supervisor, Deputy Daniel Lawson, contacted the HSU and at 8:01 
a.m., Johnson arrived in the booking area of the Jail and began his assessment of Munroe. R. p. 
3288 (30:1-25, 31:1-17); R. p. 3298 (69:17-21). Johnson finished his assessment at 8:04 a.m. 
and left the booking area. R. p. 3290 (37:15-25). Wroblewski finished fingerprinting Munroe at 
approximately 8:05 a.m. R. p. 3290 (38:1-2). After the fingerprinting, Wroblewski placed 
Munroe in the main lobby in the booking area that is in full view of the Jail staff, and where 
telephones are accessible. 55 R. p. 3287 (27:6-13). At 8:26 a.m., Wroblewski took Munroe into 
the JICS office where he sat Munroe down and began completing the Initial Classification, 
Temporary Cell Assignment questionnaire, which included asking Munroe suicide risk 
55 There is no testimony that Wroblewski knew Munroe placed any phone calls while in this 
lobby area. R. p. 3287. 
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questions. R. p. 3290 (40:9-14). Wroblewski finished the questionnaire with Munroe at 8:33 
a.m., and then escorted Munroe out of the JICS office for housing. R. p. 3291 (44:23-25); R. p. 
3292 (45: 1-2). 
Hoagland focuses on the Jail's policy of having the booking deputies contact the HSU 
any time an inmate answers "yes" to any of the suicide risk questions. However, Hoagland again 
fails to acknowledge Wroblewski's reasonable explanation for not contacting the HSU - "Jim 
Johnson was just down there and talked to him." R. p. 3298 (71:9-13) (emphasis added). 
Wroblewski repeatedly explains what happened, and Hoagland repeatedly fails to recognize it. 
R. p. 3296 (63:18-25, 64:1-25); R. p. 3289 (35:6-14); R. p. 3290 (39:8-10); R. p. 3291 (42:10-25, 
43:1-14); R. p. 3298 (71:9-25,72:1-19); R. p. 3299 (75:23-25, 76:1-14); R. p. 3300 (79:22-25, 
80: 1-2). This certainly does not amount to deliberate indifference on the part of Wroblewski. 
Even in retrospect, Wroblewski's actions were appropriate. He knew that a psychiatric 
social worker just met with Munroe, and he knew that Munroe had said that he was suicidal 
earlier, but not now -leaving no basis for another call to the HSU.56 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated, "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but 
did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the 
infliction of punishment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). The District Court 
was thus correct in finding that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent towards Munroe. 
56 In fact, Johnson was contacted twice following his assessment of Munroe - once regarding 
Munroe's request for PC, and once after Hoagland's phone call- and Johnson did not change his 
assessment. R. p. 2682 (121:24-25,122:1-6,123:23-24); R. p. 2683 (247:1-2). 
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D. The District Court Properly Granted Kate Pape Summary Judgment by Finding 
That She Was Not Deliberately Indifferent to Munroe. 57 
Kate Pape, the HSU Director ("Pape"), is the third individually named Defendant that 
Hoagland alleges was improperly dismissed by the District Court. And, while Johnson and 
Wroblewski had personal interactions with Munroe, Pape did not. As recognized by the District 
Court, in order to bring a valid claim against an individually named defendant, a "plaintiff must 
allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 
deprivation of his civil rights. Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement 
of the defendant." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, in 
order for Hoagland to be able to proceed with her claims against Pape, she must set forth specific 
personal actions by Pape that resulted in Munroe's death. However, as found by the District 
Court, the Record is void of any evidence that Pape had any personal interaction with Munroe. 
R. p. 2353. 
Alternatively, in order for Pape to be liable in her role as supervisor, Hoagland must 
show that Pape condoned or acquiesced in a subordinate's unconstitutional treatment of the 
inmate. Minix, 597 F.3d at 834. Hoagland cannot allege that Pape is liable simply for being a 
supervisor, as respondeat superior is not a valid method of attaching liability in a § 1983 action. 
See, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). As such, Hoagland is not allowed to attribute the 
actions of others to Pape. 
57 The Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity with the District Court regarding 
Pape. The District Court, however, did not rule specifically on this defense, but did ultimately 
rule that Pape was not deliberately indifferent to Munroe. The Defendants maintain that Pape is 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
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As found by the District Court, Pape "could only be found to have been deliberately 
indifferent if, in her supervisory capacity, she knew of a pattern of suicide58 or pattern of 
problems with policy enforcement by subordinates which she then condoned or to which she 
acquiesced. There is nothing in the record to support such an allegation." R. pp. 2353, 2354. 
On appeal, Hoagland still fails to point to any such facts in the Record. Instead, 
Hoagland cites to Dr. White's conclusory statements concerning his perception that the "ACJ 
administrators did not meet their obligations to provide necessary supervision or oversight 
required to ensure adequate levels of performance or policy compliance.,,59 Appellant's Brief, p. 
52. Hoagland forwards no evidentiary foundation to support such claims and, as a result, her 
accusations amount to little more than vague and conclusory allegations of official participation 
in alleged civil rights violations, which are not sufficient to defeat dismissal in a § 1983 action.6o 
Ivey v. Ed. of Regents a/the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,268 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Further, Hoagland continues to make general allegations regarding Pape without showing 
how such allegations actually resulted in Munroe's suicide. Section 1983 requires that there be a 
58 Hoagland cannot forward evidence that there was a pattern of suicide at the Jail, since there 
has only been one (1) other suicide in the Jail from 2005-2010. R. p. 2795 (7:4-15). 
Noteworthy, there were thiliy-five (35) suicide attempts that the Jail staff prevented from 2007-
2010. R. p. 2812 (74:15-25,75:1-22). 
59 Hoagland quotes Dr. White and his reference to the NCCHC (National Commission on 
Correctional Health Care) accreditation of the Jail, and to Pape's knowledge of such 
accreditation withdrawal. Appellant's Brief, pp. 52, 53. As Hoagland is well aware, the 
standards and guidelines of accreditation organizations are not determinative as to whether a 
constitutional right has been violated. See Motto v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 2010 
WL 3852373, *16 (S.D.W.Va., Mar 23,2010) (NO. CIV.A.5:06-0163). 
60 Perhaps most glaringly is the fact that Dr. White does not speak specifically to Pape's actions, 
but rather to the generic "ACJ administrators." 
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connection or link: between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been 
suffered by the plaintiff. See, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). For instance, Hoagland makes the broad allegation 
that "Pape admitted running the medical unit in an ad hoc manner irrespective of the written 
policies." Appellant's Brief, p. 53. However, a review of Pape's deposition testimony (instead 
of a few carefully selected sentences taken out of context) shows that Pape was quite thoughtful 
in her decisions regarding policy implementation,61 and constantly strived to improve the HSU. 
R. p. 2714 (33:15-25,34:1-25,35:1-7); R. p. 2760 (218:11-25). As she considered and rewrote 
the policies, she kept and followed those that were good. Id. As in any evolving system, she 
changed and improved the practice before she wrote the new policy, knowing it was more 
important to deliver the best patient care immediately, with the policy re-writes to follow. Id. 
Along the same lines as her improper reliance on NCCHC standards to prove a 
constitutional violation, Hoagland similarly points to Johnson's lack of a social worker license in 
Idaho as a per se constitutional violation. Again, however, licensure status in and of itself is not 
determinative of a constitutional violation.62 Instead, the focus is on other factors such as 
61 Hoagland ignores the well thought out reasoning that in certain instances, it is prudent to 
follow best practices instead of written policy. For example, Pape explained that the Jail's 
written policy is to have deputies hand out medications to the inmates. Upon reflection, Pape 
thought it better to have nurses actually hand out the medications, and changed this practice 
before the written policy was officially changed. R. p. 2753 (191 :13-25,192:1-6). 
62 Johnson, who received his California clinical social worker license in 1988, held that valid 
license the entire time he worked at the Jail. R. pp. 2490 (52:18-22); R. p. 2491 (55:5-25). 
Johnson explained that after moving to Idaho and beginning work at the Jail, he inquired with 
Idaho's licensing board regarding the process for obtaining a license. R. p. 2491 (56:1-25,57:1-
22). He never submitted the materials, though, as he returned to California after only being in 
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whether an official "refused to treat [the pnsoner or detainee], ignored his complaints, 
intentionally treated him incorrectly or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince 
a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Jacobson v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections, 
2008 WL 5552232, *9 (W.D.La. Dec 17,2008) (NO. CIV.A. 08-1123) (finding that inmate had 
no right to distribution of medication by licensed medical personnel) (adopted in part by 
Jacobson v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections, 2009 WL 192499 (W.D.La. Jan 23, 2009) (NO. 
CIY.A. 08-1123»; see also, Brown v. Crittenden County Sheriff's Dept., 2007 WL 2316493, *3 
(E.D.Ark., Aug 8, 2007) (NO. 307-CV-00083-SWW-BD) (inmate failed to state constitutional 
violation based merely on allegations that defendants were "[ u Jnlicense[ d], [u ]nqualified, 
[u]ntrained[ed], and [u]ncertified to dispense medication"). This is similarly true in the mental 
health context where lack of formal licensure does not equate to a constitutional violation. See, 
Minix, 597 F.3d at 831 (unlicensed mental health professional who conducted mental health 
assessment of inmate who later committed suicide was entitled to summary judgment). 
Hoagland also makes the even broader allegation that there "were many instances where 
employees of the medical unit did not know the policies of the Jail." Appellant's Brief, p. 53. 
However, Hoagland fails to cite to any portion of the Record in support of this contention other 
than Johnson's deposition, in which he testifies as to his own knowledge of such policies. Jd. 
Idaho for one and one-half (1 ;;;) years. R. p. 2491 (57:9-15). Johnson did not understand that 
he also needed a separate license in Idaho. R. p. 2491 (57:20-25); R. p. 2492 (58: 1-12). 
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As Hoagland cannot show that Pape condoned or acquiesced in a subordinate's 
unconstitutional treatment of Munroe, the District Court was correct in granting her summary 
judgment. Such dismissal should stand on appeal. 
E. The District Court Properly Dismissed the 1110nell Claims Against Ada County. 
In Nation, this Court (incorporating U.S. Supreme Court precedent) explained the 
circumstances in which a government could be sued under § 1983: 
Local governments can be sued directly under section 1983 where a "policy 
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated 
by that body's officers" deprives an individual of his or her constitutional rights. 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Additionally, governmental entities may be sued if their 
unofficial custom works a constitutional deprivation. 
Nation, 144 Idaho at 186, 158 P.3d at 962. 
This is often referred to as a Monell claim and reqUlres provmg a widespread 
unconstitutional practice so persistent, permanent, and well-settled that the governing body of 
Ada Countl3 had actual or constructive notice of it. See, Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 
861, 862 (5 th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Moreover, the policy must be a deliberate and conscious 
choice. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). In addition, "[t]here also must be a 
'direct causal link' between the policy or custom and the injury ... " Anderson v. Warner, 451 
F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Thus, to be able to pursue a § 1983 claim against a government, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that there is (i) an express unconstitutional policy (i.e. ordinance, resolution, etc.) 
63 The governing body of Ada County is the Board of Ada County Commissioners and its official 
designees. See Idaho Code § 31-602. 
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that was enacted by the government, or (ii) an unofficial unconstitutional custom adopted by the 
government. The plaintiff must also demonstrate a "direct causal link" between the policy or 
custom and the injury. 
In this particular instance, Hoagland has not pointed to any Ada County policy as 
unconstitutional. In fact, as recognized by the District Court, Hoagland appears to concede that 
Ada County had "perfectly reasonable written policies being in place to identify, protect, and 
treat inmates who are at risk for suicide .... " R. p. 1504, ~ 284. As a result, the only remaining 
avenue to pursue Ada County would be through an unconstitutional custom adopted by Ada 
County. However, this is difficult for a plaintiff to prove since limited instances do not provide a 
sufficient basis to demonstrate the existence of a custom: "A custom or policy must be shown by 
a 'clear and persistent pattern,' and three discreet instances in one investigation is simply not 
enough [for a jury] to reasonably draw such a conclusion." Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 
568 (6th Cir. 2007); see also, Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070 (the plaintiff "must be able to 
demonstrate that the injury resulted from a 'permanent and well settled practice. "'). 
Hoagland sidesteps her burden of proving an unconstitutional custom by arguing that 
official policies at the Jail were not implemented properly and, as a result, somehow fell below 
constitutional standards. This is problematic for a number of reasons. 
To begin with, Hoagland's theory relies on the assumption that failure to follow policies 
equates to a per se constitutional violation. However, Hoagland provides no legal authority to 
support such a contention and, indeed, cannot do so given that is not the law, and given that 
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adopted policies could far exceed constitutional minima. Hoagland must demonstrate the actual 
constitutional deprivation that underlies her claim. 
Moreover, merely referencing the affidavits of her experts, Dr. White and Dr. Metzner, as 
creating genuine issues of material fact is misleading. Hoagland must identify the particular 
"systematic problems with the manner in which healthcare was delivered to the inmates at the 
Jail," she alleges exist and then show how they actually resulted in a constitutional deprivation. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 50-5l. She has failed to do so. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Hoagland has not clearly set forth an unconstitutional 
"unofficial custom," even if she could she would still need to demonstrate the direct causal link 
to Munroe's suicide. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. Again, however, Hoagland has not 
specifically set forth how alleged "systemic problems" actually led to Munroe's death. Not only 
are Dr. White's statements highly speculative, especially given the lack of explanation regarding 
a nexus, but are additionally problematic given that Dr. White freely admits that nobody can 
predict suicide or even prevent it. R. p. 2185 (144: 1-2); R. p. 2192 (172: 18-25). 
As held by the District Court, "the record does not sustain a finding that Ada County 
either adopted an unconstitutional policy, or that a pattern is present that shows Ada County's 
practices constituted an unconstitutional custom." R. p. 2338. Given Hoagland's failure to do 
more than offer conclusory statements,64 the dismissal of her Monell claim should be upheld. 
64 A plaintiff must offer more than mere vague and conclusory allegations of official 
participation in civil rights violations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 
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F. The District Court Acted Within the Bounds of I.R.c.P. 54( d)(l) and Properly 
Exercised Its Discretion When Awarding the Defendants Their Costs as a Matter of 
Right and a Majority of Their Discretionary Costs. 
The District Court awarded the Defendants $15,815.31 in costs as a matter of right, and 
$77,438.12 in discretionary costs. Since the Defendants were the prevailing parties pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(1), it was appropriate for the District Court to make such an award. 
1. As the Prevailing Parties, the Defendants Are Entitled to Recover All of Their 
Costs as a Matter of Right. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1) provides that "costs shall be awarded as a matter 
of right to the prevailing party or parties .... " "The prevailing party in a civil action has a right 
to seek reimbursement of the costs incurred in prosecuting or defending the action," Fish v. 
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998). 
a. Standard of Review. 
When awarding a party's costs as a matter of right, the trial court must follow the 
guidelines set forth in LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C). George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 
386,391,766 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1988). "The question ofa trial court's compliance with the rules 
of civil procedure relating to the recovery of attorney fees or costs is one of law upon which an 
appellate court exercises free review." JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 
257, 939 P.2d 574, 576 (1997). 
b. The District Court's Award of$1 5,81 5.31 in Costs as a Matter of Right 
Falls Within the Guidelines ofIR. CPo 54(d)(J ) (C). 
Hoagland argues that the Defendants should not have been awarded $500.00 in costs paid 
to Canyon County Transcriptions for the transcription of Jail telephone calls placed by Munroe. 
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R. pp. 3802-3813. However, Hoagland failed to object to this claim with the District Court. See, 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(6). Since she did not make this argument to the District Court below, she 
consequently cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. R. pp. 3802-3813. 
Even if Hoagland can make this argument now, it is without merit. LR.C.P.54(d)(1)(C)6 
allows for the recovery of the "[r]easonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures, 
photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an 
action .... " As twenty-four (24) of the twenty-five (25) Defendants were dismissed three (3) 
weeks before trial, the transcripts could not have been admitted into evidence at trial. However, 
the Defendants did incur these costs, and such award should be upheld. 
Hoagland also argues that the award of $182.81 in service fees is not allowable. I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(C)2 allows for the recovery of "[a]ctual fees for service of any pleading or document in 
the action whether served by a public officer or other person." These costs are "actual fees for 
service," and although the documents were not ultimately served on the intended recipient, the 
Rule does not specifically provide that attempted service fees are not recoverable. 
Finally, Hoagland argues that $415.00 in court reporter fees is not recoverable. I.R.C.P. 
54( d)(1 )(C)9 provides that "[ c ]harges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in 
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action," are 
costs as a matter of right. These fees were charged to the Defendants by various court reporting 
agencies for depositions that were ultimately cancelled, but the fees were still charged and were 
still costs incurred by the Defendants in defense of this litigation. 
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In this case, the award of all of the Defendants' costs as a matter of right was within the 
parameters of LR.C.P. 54( d)(1 )(C), and should be upheld on appeal. 
2. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Awarding a Majority of the 
Defendants' Discretionary Costs. 
The prevailing party in a case may seek an award of its discretionary costs. I.R.C.P. 
54( d)(1 )(D). Here, the District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion when awarding 
the Defendants a majority of their discretionary costs, and Hoagland has failed to offer any 
legitimate argument that the District Court abused its discretion. 
a. Standard of Review. 
Regarding discretionary costs, it is within the trial court's discretion whether to make 
such an award to the prevailing party. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, l36 Idaho 681, 688-689, 39 P.3d 
621, 628-629 (2001). On appeal, the party opposing such an award bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169, 
158 P.3d 937, 945 (2007). 
b. The Defendants Mel Their Burden Regarding Discretionary Costs. 
Hoagland alleges that the Defendants did not show that their discretionary costs were 
necessary, exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against her. However, a review of the Record shows that the Defendants did meet this burden. 
In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland makes an incorrect generalization regarding 
exceptional costs "[rJoutine litigation costs are not exceptional," citing Fish in support of this 
contention. Appellant's Brief, p. 60. However, this is the same erroneous argument made in 
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Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, 133 Idaho 180, 983 P .2d 834 (1999). In that case, Phillippi 
Plaza argued that the trial court abused its discretion when awarding DeBest Plumbing 
discretionary costs for a consulting fee paid to a fire expert, costs of photographs taken for the 
benefit of the expert, and airfare for DeB est' s counsel to fly to California to take depositions. 
Phillippi Plaza argued that none of the costs were exceptional. ld., at 186, 840. Phillippi Plaza 
also wrongly argued that Fish stood for the proposition that expert fees and travel costs are never 
exceptional. This Court corrected Phillippi Plaza by stating, "Phillippi Plaza reads Fish as a 
determination that expert fees and travel costs are not exceptional. This is incorrect. Fish 
merely applied the abuse of discretion standard and concluded that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion." ld., at 187, 841. 
Here, Hoagland's similar argument fails, since discretionary costs can include "travel 
expenses along with other expenses such as photocopying, faxes, postage and long distance 
telephone calls." Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho at 187, 983 P.2d at 841. Costs can also include 
photographs and additional expert witness fees, and airfare for counsel to travel to take 
depositions. ld. As long as the district court makes the required finding, this Court has allowed 
such awards to stand unless the District Court abused its discretion. 
As found by the District Court, this is an exceptional case65 involving unique factual 
scenarios and legal arguments. SUpp. R. pp. 133-144. Section 1983 cases themselves are not 
common (especially when brought in state court), particularly when they involve inmate suicide 
65 As further evidence that this case is exceptional, Hoagland initially lodged with this Court a 
one hundred-two (102) page brief (twice the length as that allowed by the I.A.R.). This Court 
returned the brief, only allowing Hoagland a total of eighty-five (85) pages. 
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and lvionell claims. Further, as the Record shows, the suicide of an inmate in the Jail is 
extremely rare, with only one (1) other completed suicide from 2005-2010. R. p. 2795 (7:4-15). 
Since this case involved a suicide, Munroe's thought process and state of mind was 
unknown. It was therefore incumbent upon the Defendants to reconstruct what occurred they 
were required to put the pieces together to try and reconstruct a complete picture of Munroe's 
life and his state of mind in order to properly defend the allegations brought against them. This 
constituted exceptional preparation by the Defendants in putting together their defense. 
This case was also procedurally exceptional and, contrary to Hoagland's arguments, was 
exactly the type of case in which discretionary costs should be awarded. A review of the Record 
shows just how exceptional and out of the ordinary this case has been.66 
c. Hoagland Cannot Meet Her Burden o[Proving That the District Court 
Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs. 
On appeal, the party opposing an award of discretionary costs bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion. Puckett, 144 Idaho at 169, 158 P.3d at 
945. Hoagland cannot meet this burden. 
The District Court, after making specific findings regarding why it believed that this case 
was procedurally and factually exceptional, held: 
Therefore, because of the nature of the claims in this case and the complexity of 
the work Defendants und~rtook to defend against those claims, Defendants' 
request for discretionary costs for deposition travel costs, expert fees, copies of 
records, and investigator fees were exceptional, necessary, and reasonably 
incurred. The remaining consideration for the Court is whether it is in the interest 
of justice to assess discretionary costs against Plaintiff. This is a discretionary 
66 See the Procedural History in Section LA. herein, pp. 1-3. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF PAGE 69 
decision for the Court. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether it is in the 
interest of justice to award discretionary costs to Defendants. The natural 
inclination in a case such as this is to feel sympathy for a parent whose child died 
young and tragically. However, it is not unjust to award discretionary costs here. 
The Court finds it is in the interest of justice to award discretionary costs to 
Defendants. 
Supp. R. p. 140. 
The District Court then made its ultimate finding and award: 
The following of Defendants' requested discretionary costs were necessary, 
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should be assessed against the adverse party 
in the interest of justice: 1) deposition travel costs ($12,140.53); 2) Defendants' 
expert fees ($63,060.84); 3) expert fees (Plaintiff) (over $2,000 cap) ($1,700.00); 
4) copies of records ($303.00); and 5) investigator fees ($233.75). The total 
amount of discretionary costs awarded to Defendants is $77,438.12. 
ld. This Court has held that "[ e Jxpress findings as to the general character of requested costs and 
whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interest of justice is 
sufficient" to comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161,168 (2005). 
This Court has also held that trial courts need not evaluate the requested costs item by 
item. Puckett, 144 at 170, 158 P.3d at 946. "A court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional 
within the context of the nature of the case." City of McCall v. JP. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588, 
l30 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2006). This is exactly what the District Court did below. However, 
Hoagland spends several pages in the Appellant's Brief reciting how certain individual costs 
should not have been awarded because there was no support for such charges. 67 In actuality, 
67 It is interesting to note that three (3) categories of costs complained of by Hoagland were not 
actually awarded by the District Court $509.36 in postage, notary charges, and Federal Express 
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there is ample evidence in the Record to support such an award. Supp. R. pp. 50-56. The 
copying and investigator charges were awarded because, "Plaintiffs discovery production was 
limited. As a result, while undertaking their own investigation, Defendants inculTed copying 
fees and investigator fees.,,68 Supp. R. p. 140. The travel expenses were awarded because, "[I]n 
preparation for trial, Defendants took nine depositions and defended eighteen depositions, some 
of which required Defendants to incur travel expenses." Id. The excess fees paid to Hoagland's 
experts were awarded because, "Defendants also paid expert witness fees over the $2,000 cap 
allowed by Rule 54(d)(l)(C) in order to depose Plaintiffs expert witnesses." Id. The 
Defendants' expert witness fees were awarded because, "Defendants hired experts of their own, 
including a jail suicide expeli, psychiatrists, an expert social worker, and a pharmacologist." Id. 
d. There Is No Requirement That a Trial Court Must Consider the Non-
Prevailing Party's Ability to Pay When Awarding Discretionary Costs. 
At the hearing held before the District Court regarding the Defendants Memorandum of 
Costs, the District Court, almost as an aside, posed the question, "But I wonder if I can really - if 
her poverty is or her ability to pay is one of the factors that I should consider in determining 
whether or not the interest of justice require that they be paid." Tr. 09/15111 Hearing (29: 19-23). 
After raising this matter, the District Court recognized that the Record most likely is void of any 
such evidence. "You know, do I really have enough, though, in the Record other than just my 
charges; $1,181.52 for AES Temporary Employee charges; and $490.00 of the remaining Jail 
phone call transcription charges. 
68 Hoagland argues that the trial court "referenced each category of costs but never discussed any 
of the actual costs involved." Appellant's Brief, p. 82-83. This is simply not the case. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF PAGE 71 
supposition based on those phone calls which were submitted for a different purpose, to conclude 
as a matter of fact that she is poor?,,69 Tr. 09/15111 Hearing (30:12-16). 
In response to the Defendants' arguments as to why Hoagland's financial status is not a 
proper factor to consider, the District Court stated: 
There might be some case that's just right on point on this question of whether or 
not it is appropriate for the court to consider the relative wealth of a litigant in 
making this determination about whether or not it's in the interest of justice to 
award these discretionary costs to the prevailing party .... it seems to me if you did 
a quick Westlaw search, if there is such a case in this jurisdiction, you might be 
able to pull it up in a heartbeat.. .. f'm not looking for affidavits from her saying 
''I'm broke" or anything like that or tax returns. I'm looking for any case law 
that might help the court. 
Tr. 09/15/11 Hearing (33:16-25,34:1-25,35:1-2). 
When searching Idaho case law as requested by the District Court, the Defendants were 
unable to find any Idaho state case law discussing whether a court can consider a non-prevailing 
party's alleged "poveliy" when deciding such a request, as the cases primarily focus on the 
general notion of whether the district court was acting within its discretion when reaching its 
determination. Hoagland also recognized that this Court has not made a party's ability to pay a 
costs award a factor to be considered by a trial court. Supp. R. pp. 118-l32; Appellant's Brief, p. 
86. This is because the focus of the Rule, and the discussions by this Court, are on the nature of 
the costs themselves, and not whether it might be a hardship for the non-prevailing party. 
69 As noted above, the Jail phone calls were expressly stricken by the District Court. They 
certainly were not presented for the purpose of determining Hoagland's financial status and, the 
Defendants submit, should not be used for such purpose. 
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Rule 54(d)(1)(D) (and case law interpreting the Rule) does not contemplate an analysis of 
whether it would be difficult for a non-prevailing party to pay costs. If this were the case, then 
district courts would have to engage in a separate analysis regarding the financial status of the 
non-prevailing party, which most likely could only effectively and fairly be accomplished 
through evidentiary proceedings or further discovery on the matter (since in most cases the 
record would not contain adequate facts to allow the court to reach such a determination). Such 
an analysis could thwart the purpose of allowing an award of discretionary costs to the prevailing 
party, and would certainly be contrary to the notion of judicial economy. 
While the granting or denying of discretionary costs is clearly within the trial court's 
discretion, neither the Rule nor case law contemplate an analysis of the non-prevailing party's 
ability to pay, but rather, the court must make findings regarding the nature of the costs claimed. 
As such, it remains the Defendants' position that Hoagland's financial status is not an 
appropriate factor to be considered. 70 
e. Even if There Is Such a Requirement, the Record Does Not Support a 
Finding that Hoagland Is Impoverished. 
If this Court requires the consideration of a non-prevailing party's financial status, the 
Record contains insufficient facts to support a reversal on the basis that Hoagland cannot pay.71 
Even though the District Court instructed on the record that it was "not looking for 
affidavits from [Hoagland] saying 'I'm broke' or anything like that or tax returns," Hoagland 
70 In fact, the District Court seems to have not considered this as a factor, since the Order does 
not discuss this issue. 
71 The fact that the Record is void of any such evidence was recognized by the District Court at 
the September 15,2011 hearing. Tr. 09115111 Hearing (30:12-16). 
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disregarded the District Court's instruction and filed just such an affidavit ("Affidavit"). Supp. 
R. pp. 114-117. This Affidavit may not have made the case that Hoagland wished, as in 
actuality, both Hoagland and her husband are employed and they have approximately $122,520 
in equity in their house.72 By her own words, Hoagland is neither destitute nor impoverished. 
The Record does contain another affidavit from Hoagland filed on April 9, 2009 ("2009 
Affidavit"), which was filed in an attempt to persuade the District Court to waive the posting of a 
bond in this case. The District Court nonetheless required the posting of the bond, and Hoagland 
did. However, there are several difficulties in using the 2009 Affidavit. First, it was completed 
in an ex parte proceeding for the sole purpose of attempting to waive the bond requirement. 
Second, it was filed over three (3) years ago, and is not reflective of her current financial status. 
Third, at least one of the facts has changed, as Hoagland no longer has a minor child. At the 
very least, the Record does not contain a complete picture of Hoagland's current financial status. 
As required by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D), the District Court's inquiry properly revolved 
around the nature of the discretionary costs claimed by the Defendants, and not on whether 
Hoagland can pay these costs. Should this Court determine otherwise, however, the Record does 
not contain any facts indicative that Hoagland cannot pay. 
IV. A TTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Should the Defendants prevail on appeal, they request attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 12-121, 12-123, LA.R. 41, and/or42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
72 Hoagland's assessed house value IS $177,520, less her outstanding mortgage of $53,000. 
Supp. R. p. 115. 
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As explained in Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230,237 (2003), this Court 
will award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 only where the entire appeal was brought or 
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Because the series is disjunctive, 
attorney fees can be awarded where the appeal is without foundation or unreasonable or 
frivolously filed. 
Hoagland appeals all of her District Court dismissals. Continuing this case on appeal 
suggests that Hoagland has failed to take into account that she suffered dismissal of each plaintiff 
and every cause of action against every defendant in every capacity. Logic dictates that her 
appeal can have no more basis than her dismissed case below. Her Appellant's Brief does not 
forward any legitimate argument of reversible error by the District Court. Continuing this 
litigation on appeal after the District Court explained (sometimes repeatedly) why her case failed 
is unreasonable. Her appeal can thus be seen as frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Consistent with Idaho law, the District Court properly concluded that the Estate is not a 
valid § 1983 plaintiff, and Hoagland offers no argument that would require a different outcome. 
Further, the District Court's dismissal of all of the Defendants should stand, since the District 
Court properly granted James Johnson qualified immunity, properly held that Jeremy 
Wroblewski and Kate Pape were not deliberately indifferent to Munroe, and properly found that 
Ada County did not adopt an unconstitutional policy and that its practices did not represent an 
unconstitutional custom. Finally, the District Court's award of costs as a matter of right and 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF PAGE 75 
discretionary costs should be upheld, since the Defendants were the prevailing parties, and the 
Record supports such an award. 
The Defendants therefore respectfully request that this Court uphold the District Court's 
dismissal of Hoagland's entire case, uphold the award of costs, and grant the Defendants their 
costs and fees on appeal. 
.~~ 
Respectfully submitted this 1S day of March 2012. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By C;;12cCLU (; LL& 
Sherry A. Morga 
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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